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The main motivation of this research is to contribute to the body of work that 
challenges the mainstream approach to household borrowing. This contribution is twofold. 
First of all, in this research history matters, unlike in ahistorical utility analyses. This is 
accomplished by presenting data that goes back to the 1980s to support the hypothesis 
formed. This way, it is possible to see if there has been a significant shift in the relationships 
investigated. Second, this research draws on the literature from various fields such as 
psychology, medicine, sociology, and law as well as economics and finance. This allows 
the author to make a more holistic analysis of household borrowing without ignoring the 
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The Great Recession exposed a fundamental weakness of the U.S. economy: debt. 
The financial bubble that was driven by an unprecedented increase in housing prices finally 
burst in the last quarter of 2007. Many households lost their jobs, delinquency on loans 
skyrocketed, and foreclosures ensued. What started as a credit bubble ended with a real 
economic crisis that put, at one point, 1 out of every 10 labor force participants in the 
country out of their jobs. 
Dire situations spark curiosity, as did the financial impasse many U.S. households 
found themselves in in the aftermath of the recession. Economists had their fair share of 
interest in American households as well, although this interest was limited in its scope and 
methodology. The mainstream theory in economics characterizes the household as an 
extension of the hedonistic utility-maximization of individuals. The household, then, is 
simply a group of rational individuals making utility-maximizing decisions collectively 
within that group. An extension of this simple understanding of the nature of a household 
is Modigliani and Brumberg’s (1954) Life-Cycle Hypothesis. According to this theory, 
individuals (or households) make consumption decisions over their life cycles. Later on, 
Friedman (1957) complemented Modigliani’s efforts with his own Permanent Income 
Hypothesis, that explains individual (or household) consumption decisions based not only 
on their current income, but also on their future expected income. From these two theories, 





a device that individuals or households use to move economic resources in time for 
smoothing out their consumption (Santos, Costa, & Telles, 2014). One can say, according 
to the mainstream theory, debt is an indispensable part of individual rational decision 
making. Without debt, consumption smoothing would be impossible as individuals 
wouldn’t be able to shift resources across time. 
There are various issues with such conceptualization of household borrowing 
(Scott, 2007). First and foremost, it ignores the fact that households fail to make rational 
decisions more often than not. It is fairly difficult for an average American household to 
understand the terms of a mortgage agreement, let alone be able to estimate accurately their 
permanent income in order to make perfectly rational decisions. Avery and Turner (2012), 
for instance, explain how inaccurate predictions about one’s future income, in an economy 
with large gaps in the life-time earnings of different career paths, can easily result in 
overborrowing in student loans. A second issue with the mainstream approach to household 
borrowing is that household tastes are treated exogenously. However, households’ habits 
of thought are inseparable from the institutional structure they are embedded in. Therefore, 
changes in the institutions of the economy will be reflected in the household decision 
making. Borrowing decisions of households are very much endogenous to the financial and 
legal institutions that are in place in the economy. Third, credit and debt are “a dyadic unit” 
(Peebles, 2010). They define a power relation together, and one can’t exist without the 
other. Also, this power structure is peculiar to the time and space it exists in: “In some 
instances, perhaps creditors are socially powerful usurers and debtors are their weak 
targets, but on other occasions, debtors can be enormously powerful too, as the American 





the mainstream approach excludes the multidimensional aspect of indebtedness by 
reducing borrowing decisions to utility maximization. Debt maximizes utility only to the 
extent that it can be repaid. Unpaid debt has both negative financial consequences such as 
restricted access to credit, but also negative social consequences such as lower mental and 
physical health. 
The main motivation of this research is to contribute to the body of work that 
challenges the mainstream approach to household borrowing. This contribution is twofold. 
First of all, in this research history matters, unlike in ahistorical utility analyses. This is 
accomplished by presenting data that goes back to the 1980s to support the hypothesis 
formed. This way, it is possible to see if there has been a significant shift in the relationships 
investigated. Second, this research draws on the literature from various fields such as 
psychology, medicine, sociology, and law as well as economics and finance. This allows 
me to make a more holistic analysis of household borrowing without ignoring the 
institutional, social, and psychological dimensions of the issue.  
There are four chapters to this dissertation. It starts with a historical analysis of the 
institutional changes in the U.S. economy that played a significant role in the increased 
indebtedness of the U.S. households. In the second chapter, I investigate how households 
responded to such institutional changes by looking at the evolution of their attitudes toward 
borrowing. A multivariate analysis of ten waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances from 
1983 to 20131 suggests that there has been a structural change in the relationship between 
attitudes toward borrowing and explanatory factors since 1983 and also between attitudes 
and indebtedness since 2007. Accounting for these structural changes, I find that, after 
                                                          
 





financial liberalization, households developed more positive attitudes toward borrowing. 
However, in the postrecession period, indebted households responded to the new economic 
reality by changing their attitudes in a more conservative direction. 
The next chapter investigates the association between indebtedness and household 
health with a historical viewpoint. As pointed out earlier, debt is useful to the extent that it 
can be repaid. Indebted households are either about to experience financial strain (low 
liquidity, net negative financial worth or high leverage) or are already in financial strain 
(fallen behind in payments). Evidence from eleven waves of the Survey of Consumer 
Finances suggests that indebtedness is associated with lower self-reported health of 
household heads. It is also interesting that this association is stronger after 2001, indicating 
that the perverse effect of indebtedness on household health increases during the credit 
boom of the 2000s. 
In the last chapter, the discussion is directed at a growing concern of the American 
public and the media: student loan debt. The sudden increase in the delinquency rate of 
student loans across the country that coincided with the historically low homeownership 
rate of young households has drawn scholarly interest. This part brings in a more general 
discussion of the possible effect of student loan debt on young households’ borrowing 
decisions. Using the 2007-09 panel of the Survey of Consumer Finances, I estimate a model 
of loan applications for the sample of young households (between ages 24 and 35). The 
results of this estimation suggest that contrary to the popular belief, student loan debt had 
a positive effect on the outcomes of loan applications of young households with no college 
degree. However, the effect of a college degree itself was far greater than the positive effect 





same. Different kinds of debt have different effects on households’ financial decisions. 
Also, investing in a college degree is a worthwhile effort as far as credit applications are 
concerned. If there is a retreat of young households from the credit markets in general and 
the housing market in particular, it doesn’t seem to be due to student loan debt. 
These three chapters come together to form a research project that provides an 
alternative multidisciplinary and historical approach that takes into account that household 
decision making is endogenous to the institutional structure of the U.S. socioeconomic 
system. Debt has far more overarching impacts on household wellbeing than simply 
smoothing out consumption by shifting economic resources across time. Debt is social as 
much as it is financial. Therefore, borrowing decisions cannot be reduced to individual 
utility maximization and should be investigated with much more social precision through 
revealing the ways in which it interacts with our socioeconomic existence. All the parts to 
this dissertation have one common theme: Debt is endogenous to the household reality in 
the United States, both economic and social. Households use debt to make up for losses in 
earnings, to improve their living standards and also to increase future earnings. However, 
during this process, they are influenced by the very social institutions they helped create in 
the first place. These institutions are not static either, they respond to changing economic 
circumstances. For instance, since the 1980s, U.S. households helped create the institution 
of abundance through obsessive use of debt. Nevertheless, they responded to the economic 
reality of the Great Recession by changing their attitude toward debt. Debt is endogenous 
to the household social reality also in the sense that it has immediate consequences on their 
health as well as being a tool to buy better healthcare and make better health choices. 





generate higher future income, such as education loans. In that sense, having education 
loan debt is both enabling and a burden. Although education loan debt is a positive indicator 
of higher earnings for someone who hasn’t graduated from college yet, it can very well be 
a burden for a college graduate young household that reduces the positive financial gains 
of a college degree. This endogeneity of debt is why a more holistic approach is necessary 




















INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEBT IN THE  
 
UNITED STATES  
 
 
In September of 2013, trapped in the middle of a political showdown, the U.S. 
government had to close its doors due to a disagreement in Congress on whether or not the 
federal debt ceiling should be raised. Coming very close to a debt default, this simple 
political dilemma, not so long after a major recession, reminded many of us once more that 
debt could bring havoc, especially when it is not sustainable. The expenditure of the US 
government, like any other government, is funded by taxes and borrowing. Economists’ 
worry about the U.S. economy doesn’t come as a big surprise when we consider that 
government expenditure is almost 20% of the U.S. GDP, greater than private investment 
that remains at 15%. If the possible financial default of an institution that makes one fifth 
of the economy is alarming, the default of the U.S. households, consumption of which 
constitutes almost three fourths of the economy, deserves closer attention. 
It is not the first time in history that the balance sheet of U.S. households has been 
in the center of attention. The literature on the Great Depression is full of evidence of the 
deteriorating effect of the stock market crash on U.S. households and an eventual collapse 
of the aggregate demand (Mishkin, 1978). The Great Recession of 2008 once more showed 
that a financially fragile household sector that is overburdened with debt obligations is an 
imminent threat to the functioning of an economy that has historically relied on the 





For an orthodox mind, household debt is not a threat in perfect financial markets. 
Households accumulate debt to smooth their life-cycle consumption. As the Life-Cycle 
Hypothesis implies, any well-informed and rational household would optimize their 
dissaving today based on future saving and wealth (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). Credit 
allows households to move funds across time (Ryan, Trumbull, & Tufano, 2011). Without 
such temporal mobility of funds, household consumption would be restricted to current 
disposable income. Although the theory is fool proof, its weakness is in its elegant 
simplicity. Neither the financial markets nor the households are perfectly rational. Due to 
misinformed borrowers with near-sighted expectations in a market full of predatory 
lenders, the life-cycle consumption/saving equations are far from optimizing. Moreover, if 
accumulated debt is used for spending on non-wealth-accumulating consumption (i.e. 
nondurables), the positive wealth effects of the debt will be minimal (Montgomorie, 
2006).2 
The issues household debt causes are multidimensional. First and foremost, rising 
debt obligations force households to allocate a higher proportion of their disposable income 
so that they can turnover their debt when their debt repayments grow faster than their 
income, meaning that they have to cut back on other spending unless they stop paying their 
debt. The increase in the debt service ratio of U.S. households between 1991 and 2006 by 
3.5% shows the extent of the problem (Johnson & Li, 2007). For households with heavy 
debt burdens, however, repaying their debt back might not be an option due to the necessity 
of maintaining a minimum standard of living. In this case, these households are likely to 
stop paying their debts. Figure 1 shows the significant increase in personal bankruptcy rates 
                                                          
 






Figure 1. Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Filings in the United States 
*U.S. Courts Bankruptcy Statistics, American Bankruptcy Institute 
  
since 1980. Although there has been a decrease in the last two years, total non-business 
filings (including Chapter 7, 11, and 13) grew at an average annual rate of 14.48% between 
1980 and 2010. Also, among total filings, the share of consumer filings increased from 
86.81% in 1980 to 96.61% in 2012. Given the credit rating system in the United States, 
these figures can be taken as evidences of a contraction in the credit supply for an 
increasing number of U.S. households. Households that are highly indebted in the short run 
and credit constrained in the medium run don’t have much choice but to decrease their 
demand for consumption. Consumers carrying a heavier debt burden decrease their 
consumption after a financial downturn that is followed by a decline in tangible asset prices 
(Ogawa & Wan, 2007). This result is often attributed to the decline in household wealth 
after a financial collapse (Campbell & Hercowitz, 2009).  
Nevertheless, this paper is not about the impacts of household borrowing on the 
















reasons that brought U.S. households to the current impasse. In doing so, I intend to use an 
institutional and historical approach. What were the institutional factors that encouraged 
and allowed, if not forced, U.S. households to borrow more? Historically, the post-1980s 
signified an era of depressed real wages and deregulation of both financial and goods 
markets across the globe. It is natural to think that in times of decreased purchasing power 
households will try to make up the difference by borrowing more. However, it is important 
to separate this income effect, which increases demand for credit ceteris paribus, from two 
other effects. First, deregulation of the financial markets, coupled with immense financial 
innovation, increased the availability of credit at a lower cost for consumers (Dynan & 
Kohn, 2007). This can be visualized as a movement on the demand for credit due to a shift 
in supply. Second, a shift in the attitudes of consumers towards borrowing and holding debt 
increased the demand for credit given the cost of borrowing, which can be visualized as an 
upward shift of the demand for credit (Norton, 1993; Pollin, 1988). 
In the next part of this paper, we will first talk about institutional changes in the 
financial sector that had immense impacts on the borrowing decisions of U.S. households 
after the 1980s. Later, we will discuss how the decision making of U.S. households was 
affected by these institutional changes. Particular attention will be given to the changes in 
credit attitudes of U.S. households and the correlation between debt and credit attitudes. 
Following this, findings from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) will be presented. I 
expect a change of credit attitudes in a positive direction, indicating that households have 
been more accepting of debt in the United States. I will conclude with a discussion of 







Financial Deregulation, Innovation, and Legal Reforms 
 
The post-80s economics were built upon the simple tenet of deregulation in every 
front of the economy. The financial market in the United States was not an exception. The 
major shift in ideology in the U.S. political economy from a Keynesian to a Neoliberal one 
can be tracked in numerous institutional changes since the 1980s (Sherman, 2009). I leave 
the detail of these institutional changes to a later discussion in this paper. The repercussions 
of these political arrangements on the credit market, on the other hand, are of primary 
concern here. 
Financial deregulation achieved one crucial thing that is a pillar of any capitalist 
system: greater access to credit. Especially when the real wages are stagnant, access to 
cheap credit is the only way to maintain standard of living for households. The real earnings 
were stagnant throughout 1980s and 90s, with little recovery in the last decade (see Figure 




Figure 2. Median Real Weekly Earnings in the United States (Weekly Earnings / CPI) 
















 However, we need to distinguish between the different ways access to credit can be 
expanded. As orthodoxy has claimed, decrease in the interest rate causes an increase in the 
demand for credit, which I earlier described as a movement on the demand for credit. On 
the other hand, due to fall in equity requirements, the demand for credit also shifted up. 
Moreover, the case for an expansion in the supply of credit can be easily made in a less 
regulated financial market with relaxed lending conditions (Campbell & Hercowitz, 2009; 
Montgomorie, 2006). Financial deregulation after the 1980s has been found to be 
responsible for a 2.25% decline in private saving rates in the UK between 1980 and 1988 
(Bayoumi, 1993). Private savings in the United States has a strikingly similar trend (see 
Figure 3). It is evident that U.S. households were saving 9% less of their disposable income 
in 2000 than they were in 1975. Such a sharp decline in two and a half decades cannot be 




Figure 3. U.S. Private Saving Rate (Annual Average) 



























































































































On the supply side, an important deregulation was in the housing market. The first 
institutional change came with the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act in 1980. This act allowed mortgage institutions to compete with commercial 
banks by opening avenues for giving consumer loans and investing in commercial paper 
and corporate bonds (Mishkin, 1990). Also, usury ceilings on mortgage loans were 
eliminated with this act. Later, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act as a part 
of The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act in 1982 preempted state laws that 
restricted banks from making any mortgages other than fixed-rate amortizing. This allowed 
banks to give mortgage loans other than traditional 30-year fixed rate (Ryan et al., 2011). 
With variable interest rate mortgages, banks could cater to subprime borrowers as well as 
prime ones. For borrowers, these various instruments not only mean greater access to credit 
but also more complexity that requires an even more careful calculation in borrowing. 
However, imperfect expectations about the future combined with information overload 
when making complex financial decisions often lead to psychological biases in these 
decisions for borrowers. With more complex contracts, lenders feed into these biases to 
take advantage of asymmetric information, increasing the defaults especially in the 
subprime market (Nofsinger, 2012). 
Further deregulatory arrangements were enacted in the 1990s. The Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act allowed banks to open up branches 
nationwide without separate subsidiaries. In 1999, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which 
prohibited the consolidation of commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, and 







As suggested earlier, households rely more on credit when their real earnings 
decrease. According to the conventional microeconomic theory, if households have lower 
real income then they will demand less goods and services, ceteris paribus. However, if 
households perceive availability of credit as an increase in disposable income, then greater 
access to credit would translate into higher demand for goods and services, even when real 
earnings decline. Real household spending, with 1984 prices, grew by 11.09% between 
1972-73 and 1992, 6.31% between 1992 and 2002, and contracted by 0.92% between 2002 
and 2012. On average, between 1972-73 and 2012, real household spending has expanded 
by approximately 17% (see Figure 4). Given the deterioration of real earnings, borrowing 
is the only way to finance such an expanding demand for goods and services. 
At the cognitive level, consumers can only want things that exist in the marketplace 
 
 
Figure 4. Average Real Household Expenditure in the United States (1984 Dollars) 














and can only buy things that they can afford given their resources. What we know, our 
objective reality, or what we imagine we know, our subjective reality, both have immediate 
effects on what we want. For instance, regardless of its affordability, we may want to fly 
to our destination instead of driving because we know flying is faster, more comfortable, 
and most crucially it is possible. If it is not affordable, we can’t realize our wants. Hence, 
our behavior is a function of our budget, whereas our wants depend on our subjective and 
objective reality. Therefore, an expansion of the market in terms of availability of goods 
and services make people want more. On the other hand, an increase in the perceived 
budget enables people to realize their consumption decisions more often. 
Innovation in the U.S. financial sector played a significant role in shaping both 
wants and the perceived budget of U.S. households. The most extensive use of consumer 
credit in U.S. history, and most likely the turning point in U.S. household finances, was 
1919, when General Motors Acceptance Corporation gave the first manufacturer auto loan 
to middle-income car purchasers (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2004). With the 
increase in car ownership came the necessity for convenient use of money in transactions, 
which now expanded beyond hometowns. Hence, gasoline companies and retail and 
department stores offered cards to consumers to ease their transactions when they were 
travelling. However, the major step was the introduction of Diners Club in 1949, which 
was later followed by American Express and Bank Americard (now known as Visa) in 
1958, and MasterCard 1966 (Ryan et al., 2011). Widespread use of credit cards to settle 
daily transactions was an important turning point in consumer finances. It not only made 
existing consumer items more affordable because of a perceived increase in disposable 





reality of consumers (Durkin, 2000). 
Another crucial breaking point for U.S. household finances was the introduction of 
home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s. For 
many U.S. households, equity in property has been a major source of asset. In 1962 around 
26% of total household assets were composed of equity in owned property (Projector, 
1964). In 1970, this increased to 60% of all assets and in 1983 it was 63% of all assets 
(Avery et al., 1984). Therefore, being able to borrow against the biggest chunk of their 
assets gives households access to a larger and cheaper pool of credit because it is secured 
by their property. 
The financial innovation that revolutionized the financial market was 
securitization, which allowed banks to move receivable credits off their balance sheet and 
still make profit (Montgomorie, 2006). This financial device not only makes existing loans 
more profitable, but also allows bank to lend to subprime borrowers at higher interest rates 
because the risk on the loan is transferred to other investors. The mortgage-backed 
securities market expanded with the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act in 
1984 recognizing mortgage-backed securities in the subprime market as valid forms of 
investments (Ryan et al., 2011). Soon after, securitization of nonmortgage loans followed, 
first in auto loans in 1985 and then in consumer loans in 1986, making securitization a 
common practice in the loan industry. 
The change in the banks’ lending criteria from a fixed ratio of disposable income 
to debt repayment to a variable ratio was also another factor that contributed to the 






Bankruptcy and Tax Reforms 
Two major changes in the legal institutional structure affected the demand for credit 
significantly. First of all, a major change in the bankruptcy law with the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Reform Act not only made filing Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcies easier, but also 
increased the federal bankruptcy exemptions (Gropp, Scholz, & White, 1997). Although 
most of the states opted out of the federal exemptions and set their own by 1983, the new 
state exemptions were most often higher than the pre-1978 levels, with considerable 
variance across the states. The federal exemption, which was set as $7500 for homestead 
and $4000 for nonhomestead property, was further raised with the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform 
Act (Gropp et al., 1997). It was not until 2005 that filing consumer bankruptcy in the United 
States was a painstaking practice. The ease and appeal of bankruptcy filing encouraged 
U.S. households to get under heavier liability with minimal legal and financial sanctions. 
The evidence from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) shows that state level 
bankruptcy exemptions have a statistically positive impact on the level of household debt 
for high-asset households. It appears that low asset households are discouraged from 
borrowing due to increased risk of default in high exemption states that translates into 
higher interest rates (Gropp et al., 1997). 
The other institutional change came with the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Unlike 
conventional consumer credit such as credit cards, HELOCs were considered as home 
mortgages for tax purposes and the interest payments were deductible. Once the 1986 act 
ended the deductibility of interest payment on credit cards, the appeal of HELOCs 
increased significantly (Park, 1993). Figure 5 shows the change in the share of total 






Figure 5. Ratios of Total Consumer and Revolving Consumer Credit to Total Liability of 
the Household Sector in the United States 
*Federal Reserve Statistical Release 
 
nonprofit organizations in the United States. It is evident that despite the fall in the share 
of total consumer credit in total liabilities, the share of revolving consumer credit has been 
climbing steadily since the late 70s until the early 2000s. Since HELOCs are considered a 
revolving credit like credit cards, this steady increase in revolving consumer credit in the 
80s and 90s can be attributed partly to the extensive use of both credit cards and HELOCs.  
 
The Institutionalization of Indebtedness 
The 1980s are considered to be years of significant shift in the economic policies 
of capitalism. After multiple economic crises in the 70s, the rationale for a proactive 
government with Keynesian influences on the economy lost its appeal in Anglo-American 
politics (Montgomorie, 2006). The post-80s economic agenda, the so-called Neoliberalism, 









Total Consumer Credit / Total Liability





policies aimed at reviving the American capitalist class at the expense of the working class, 
which enjoyed relative prosperity during the 1950s and 60s. The one-size-fits-all economic 
ideal was deregulated markets in every corner of the world economic system. 
 
Do-It-Yourself Finance and Increased Risk-Taking 
An outstanding number of financial instruments became available to U.S. 
households as a result of financial innovation and deregulation (Ryan et al., 2011). With 
the natural proclivity to individualize their choices, American society seized the 
opportunity to make personalized financial decisions and take control of their finances. The 
result of this increase in D-I-Y household finance was significantly increased risk taking 
of U.S. households. Figure 6 shows the percentage of respondents in the SCFs from 1983 
to 2010 (with the exception of 1986) who gave an answer to the question: “Which of the 
statements on this page comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you (and your 
[husband/wife]) are willing to take when you save or make investments?” The striking 
decrease in the percentage of people who would take no financial risk and also the increase 
in the percentage of people who would take above average financial risk are suggestive of 
the increased risk-taking behavior of U.S. households since the early 1980s.  
The literature on the effect of risk-taking behavior on household indebtedness isn’t 
an exhaustive one. Duca and Rosenthal (1991, 1993) first modeled household demand for 
credit using 1983 SCF and taking into account the selection bias that is inherent to credit 
markets. Their TOBIT estimations showed that being risk averse increased the demand for 
credit for credit-constrained households, whereas it decreased it for the full sample. 






Figure 6. Percentage of Respondents Who Answered: “Which of the statements on this 
page comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you (and your [husband/wife] are 
willing to take when you save or make investments?” 
*Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances 
 
behavior compared to successful users. Crook (2001) used 1995 SCF in a model similar to 
Duca and Rosenthal’s. The results from the double selection model for households that are 
not credit constrained show that risk-averse households tend to demand less debt. These 
studies are indicative of a possibly significant link between risk-taking behavior and 
indebtedness of households. 
 
Advertisement: The “Institution of Abundance” 
 
In a world of social insulation, in which social interaction is reduced mostly to 
online networks, the connection to the market is the predominant way individual decisions 
are open to exogenous stimulus. We no longer ask our relatives or friends for advice on 
consumption or financial decisions but rather seek information in the market ourselves. 
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connection to the market is. And there is no tool yet available to the marketer more 
powerful than an advertisement in facilitating product exposure. 
With a conventional approach, advertisements can be seen as tools that will increase 
market efficiency and competition through providing better information at almost no cost 
to customers, because better informed individuals are assumed to make more rational 
decisions. Although this might have been the case in a fairly competitive market structure 
with small retailers trying to inform customers on the availability and price of their 
products in the early 20th century, the rise of monopoly capital in the mid-1900s and the 
resulting conglomeration of the market led to firms relying heavily on advertisements to 
consolidate their oligopolistic power through product differentiation (McChesney, Foster, 
Stole, & Holleman, 2009). 
From the 1980s onwards, the U.S. capitalism faced an important impasse. The 
purchasing power of the working class, which had been the backbone of  effective demand 
in the 50s and 60s, was systematically brought down as a result of labor market 
liberalization. On the other hand, concentrated product markets had to find new outlets to 
keep the capitalist in the black. One way the manufacturers dumped their excess production 
was through liberalized international trade. However, that proved to be a very competitive 
business. Domestically, the tremendous increase in the sales effort through extensive 
advertising, which has become ever more cheap and easy thanks to the digital revolution, 
was the institution that kept the average American consuming. Figure 7 shows the real 
aggregate advertising spending in the United States between 1960 and 2007 with constant 
2009 prices. The upward trend becomes more prominent after the mid-1970s. The 






Figure 7. Real Advertising Expenditure in the United States (Nominal Ad. Exp. / GDP 
Deflator) 




billion in 2000 with 2009 prices, an almost three-fold increase in 25 years.  
Potter (2007) calls advertising an “institution of abundance” because of its power 
in projecting the market to the society as a place of unhindered and readily available source 
of every good and commodity, but of course for a price. The audience for most of the 
advertisements is average to high-income households. However, every income group has 
access to advertisement through media. What is depicted in advertisements as the desired 
living standard is, most of the time, beyond the reach of low-income families (Cynamon & 
Fazzari, 2008). Yet, being exposed to a higher standard of living at every corner of the 
daily routine, those households are likely to perceive the advertised living standard and the 
products associated with it as indispensable necessities. De Graaf, Wann, and Naylor 



























































































































contagious, socially transmitted condition of overload, debt, anxiety, and waste resulting 
from the dogged pursuit of more.” Advertisements have set the “frame of reference” in 




The current indebtedness of U.S. households cannot be explained only by looking 
at the economic aspect of the issue. It is evident that households, especially those at the 
bottom of the income distribution, have had little real income gains since the early 1970s. 
When income is stagnant, spending should be stagnant as well, according to the mainstream 
explanation of consumer decision making. Therefore, borrowing should not increase. The 
fact is, household borrowing has increased. 
With a more holistic approach, this study searches for an explanation by 
investigating the changes in the institutions that are critical to households’ economic 
decisions. The first of these institutions is the financial sector. Important changes in the 
regulatory framework, the sector itself, and the legal framework surrounding household 
finances culminated in a rapid deregulation of the financial markets in the United States 
beginning in the late 1970s. Numerous acts passed by congress, beginning with the repeal 
of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980, had one 
common purpose: expand the supply of credit. In the meantime, lenders’ ingenuity in 
devising new ways to spend household dollars (credit cards and HELOCs) and also to 
funnel investor dollars (securitization) into new loans made it significantly cheaper and 
easier to borrow for households. Also, changes in the bankruptcy and tax laws reduced the 





HELOCs and credit cards.  
The variety of different financial products and the multiplicity of the source made 
the financial landscape a complex labyrinth to navigate. However, U.S. households 
responded to this complexity by taking matters into their own hands instead of trusting 
financial professionals to take care of their finances. There is a strong cultural influence of 
American self-sufficiency in this without a doubt. However, the rise in the proportion of 
households that are ready to take increased financial risk has also been largely influenced 
by the aforementioned changes in the institutions of finance. Securitization is one of the 
easiest ways to blend risk in less risky assets. Although it sounds utterly useful to reduce 
risk, the financial collapse in 2008 proved that securitization elevated the level of risk by 
making it harder to identify. Moreover, relentless bombardment of U.S. households with 
ideas and possibilities of affluence through increased advertising and social influence gave 
people all the reasons they needed to legitimize their indebtedness and feel a necessity to 
borrow more. 
It is no coincidence that U.S. households are indebted today. It is a result of 
conscious political decisions that changed the institutions of household finance in a 
peculiar way. Nevertheless, institutions are evolutionary. The institution of indebtedness, 
the social acceptance of debt, is no exception. The next thing we need to investigate is how 
households responded to their rising level of debt as they began to feel the social and 
economic pressure their indebtedness created. We expect a backward causal effect of 











THE EVOLUTION OF HOUSEHOLD ATTITUDES 
 
 
It has been argued by many that later in the 20th century, Americans had more 
sanguine attitudes toward holding debt (Pollin, 1988). Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) argue 
that the baby-boomer generation’s taking over American consumption in the 1980s was 
responsible for the relaxed attitude toward holding debt. With the end of the Cold War, the 
“we won” effect might have led to more optimistic expectations about the future and a 
further relaxation of attitudes toward debt (Norton, 1993).  
There is evidence that attitude is an important determinant of household debt at the 
micro level. Duca and Rosenthal (1991, 1993) were the first to model the determinants of 
credit constraints and demand using SCF data with adverse selection taken into account. 
They don’t look at the effects of general attitude3 toward credit, but rather focus on specific 
attitude4 toward credit. It is noteworthy to add that they also control for risk-taking attitude. 
For the 1983 survey, in a bivariate PROBIT model, households with positive attitude 
toward borrowing for an auto or furniture and people with favorable attitude toward 
borrowing for luxury items such as a fur coat or jewelry are more likely to hold positive 
debt. Crook (2001) later used the 1995 SCF within a similar methodology, but didn’t 
                                                          
 
3General attitude is indicated by the answer to the question in SCF: “In general, do you think it is a 
good idea or a bad idea for people to buy things on an installment plan?” 
 
4There are also specific attitude questions in the SCFs to determine respondents’ attitude toward 
borrowing for the purchase of certain items such as to cover for living expenses, to finance an expensive fur 






include the attitude toward borrowing. As a confounding factor, Livingstone and Lunt 
(1992) investigated the relation of attitudinal factors as well as other psychological factors 
such as focusing on economic attributions, locus of control, coping strategies and consumer 
pleasure. For a sample of mostly low- and middle-income families in the UK, they found 
evidence for the positive effect of positive attitude toward borrowing on both the amount 
of debt held and the repayment of debt. Tokunaga (1993) also found that unsuccessful 
credit users differ significantly in similar psychological traits from successful credit users. 
Lea, Webley, and Levine (1993) used surveys among people that are in no, mild, or serious 
debt to a public utility company in UK. They concluded, among other significant factors 
associated with debt such as lower income, not owning a home, having more children, and 
being younger and single, that serious debtors are more permissive to debt. However, they 
found no statistically significant effect of attitudes toward debt on indebtedness using a 
multivariate analysis for the same sample of people, although there was some correlation 
between the two. Both Davies and Lea (1995), and later Hayhoe, Leach, and Turner (1999) 
investigated the determinants of credit use among college students. The first study looked 
at a sample of undergraduate students in their 1st, 2nd, and 3rd year at the University of 
Exeter in a pseudolongitudinal study. Although the correlation between favorable credit 
attitude and debt outstanding was weak for the 1st year cohort, it appeared to be stronger 
for the 2nd and 3rd year cohorts. This finding indicates that there is a possible causality 
running from indebtedness to attitude toward debt. The second study focused on credit card 
use among 426 students in the spring 1997 semester attending five state-funded colleges in 
the United States. The findings suggest that students with 4 or more credit cards have more 





Lea (1995). Webley and Nyhus (2001) also made a similar assertion. Chien and DeVaney 
(2001) used a stepwise selection based on 15% significance level and looked at the 
determinants of both installment and credit card debt using a TOBIT regression for 1998 
SCF. For installment debt, general credit attitude was found to have a significant positive 
impact on the debt outstanding, whereas for credit card debt, specific credit attitude index5 
had a significant positive impact on credit card debt outstanding. Castellani and DeVaney 
(2001), on the other hand, focused on a specific attitude variable, namely the attitude 
toward borrowing to cover living expenses. In 1995, using a logistic model with the SCF, 
they found that people who thought borrowing to cover for living expenses was acceptable 
when income is cut tend to be younger, non-White, low income, and make their credit card 
payments late. In another study, Kim and DeVaney (2001) used 1998 SCF to distinguish 
between the determinants of credit use between convenience and revolving credit card 
users.6 Revolving credit card users had a more positive attitude towards both general and 
specific uses of credit than convenience users. Also, a selectivity corrected model showed 
that a positive general attitude toward credit is associated both with positive outstanding 
balance and level of balance. Stone and Maury (2006) reached a similar conclusion on the 
effect of credit attitude on indebtedness for 501 Air Force personnel. Watson (2003) took 
a different approach and looked at the effect of another attitudinal variable on indebtedness 
of 700 urban and nonurban residents of Pennsylvania, a sample that mimicked the U.S. 
population in terms of location, income, and age. The variable they investigated was what 
                                                          
 
5Chien and DeVaney (2001) sum up positive responses to specific credit attitude questions in SCF 
to generate an index ranging from 0 to 5.  
 
6Convenience users are the people who use a credit card due to its convenience as a means of 





they called a “materialism index,” an index that measures how materialistic an individual 
is. People with a high materialism index were found to have significantly positive attitudes 
toward borrowing over 90 days for various reasons, ranging from buying a car to buying 
expensive sporting equipment, were more likely to accumulate credit card debt, pay finance 
charges on credit cards, and use installment credit, but didn’t differ significantly in the level 
of debt held compared to less materialistic people. Finally, Wang, Lu, and Malhotra (2011) 
sampled credit card customers of a commercial bank in Shanghai and find that risk-taking 
and positive debt attitudes are associated with higher frequency of both revolving credit 
card and petty installment use. 
There is no study in the literature that looked at the correlation between 
indebtedness and credit attitude from a historical viewpoint. The cross-sectional correlation 
between attitude and indebtedness point to the causality from attitude to debt. In other 
words, from these studies we can see that households with positive attitude towards 
borrowing are more indebted. However, it is possible there is also a backward causality 
from indebtedness to attitude. It is very likely that as households become more indebted 
they will begin to form less positive attitudes toward credit. This kind of correlation is hard 
to identify at the cross-section because of its longitudinal nature. This research is not an 
attempt to identify the nature of causality, as that requires complex endogenous modelling 
and also longitudinal data. By acknowledging the complexity of the causality between 
indebtedness and attitudes toward borrowing, this study aims to reveal whether or not there 
has been significant change in the correlation between indebtedness and attitudes. 
Considering the significant institutional changes that took place in the U.S. economy after 





expect to see major changes in the correlation between indebtedness and attitudes.  
 
Data and Methodology 
Data comes from 10 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) since 1983, 
excluding the 1986 wave because it didn’t include questions on attitude toward credit. SCF 
is a triennial survey sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and was conducted by the 
Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan from 1983 to 1989 and by the 
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago since 1992. Currently it 
stands as the survey that collects the most detailed information on U.S .households’ 
finances as well as financial opinions.  
There are two challenges to using a complex survey data such as SCF. First of all, 
missing observations are imputed for dollar variables. Up until 1989, SCF employed single 
imputation techniques. From 1989 onwards multiple imputation techniques have been used 
in SCF to impute missing observations.7 If not accounted for, multiple imputation can 
inflate variances for estimates, causing false inference for both descriptive statistics and 
regression analysis. This is also called “imputation error” (Kennickell, 1998). Necessary 
corrections have to be applied to the multiply imputed data to avoid bias (Montalto & Yuh, 
1998).The other problem with SCF is called sampling variability error.8 Due to privacy 
concerns, SCF doesn’t release crucial details on households that are necessary for 
resampling. However, as an alternative, SCF publishes replicate weights for 1989 onwards.  
Thankfully, there is a user-written macro in Stata called scfcombo that allows 
                                                          
 
7Please see Montalto and Sung (1996) for an easy to read discussion on multiple imputation in SCF. 
 





researchers to correct for both imputation and sampling variability error easily. However, 
for this macro to work, there have to be replicate weights available. Because the waves 
prior to 1989 don’t have replicate weights, it is impossible to employ this Stata tool when 
all the waves, including the waves from 1983 and 1986, are pooled together.  
An alternative is to employ Stata’s mi estimation. This requires defining the pooled 
data as imputed data. The difficulty is that waves prior to 1989 are imputed with single 
imputation techniques. Luckily, Stata can be easily fooled into thinking that singly imputed 
data are actually multiply imputed by merging 5 identical sets into a single set. This way, 
all the waves can be pooled into a single mi dataset and mi estimation commands can be 
employed. Hence, the following estimates for descriptive statistics, coefficients and 
marginal probabilities are all corrected for imputation error. Note that, given the pooled 
nature of the data, it is not possible to correct for the sampling variability error.  
 
Household Attitudes 
In the SCF the following question is asked to households: “In general, do you think 
it is a good idea or a bad idea for people to buy things on an installment plan?” Households 
could pick between three answers: “Good Idea, Sometimes Good Sometimes Bad Idea, 




 There has been a significant amount of research on identifying financial ratios that 
best represent household indebtedness (DeVaney, 1994; DeVaney & Lytton, 1995; Garrett 





measures stand out as most widely used and best represent financial strain of households. 
Solvency ratio, which is the ratio of household total assets to total debt, stands as the first 
important factor in identifying households in financial distress. Due to the large number of 
households in our data that have no debt, this ratio is coded into a binary variable, insolvent, 
which is equal to 1 if a household has a solvency ratio below 1.  The other measure that 
stands out in the literature is monthly debt payments to monthly income ratio, 
debttoincome. Monthly debt payments are the summation of regular monthly debt 
obligations, including mortgage contracts, car loans, lines of credit and various types of 
regular payment consumer loans. If a regular debt obligation frequency was different than 
per month, its monthly values is included. Monthly income is household annual gross 
income divided by twelve. A binary recode of debttoincome is highleverage, which is equal 
to 1 if a household has a debt-to-income ratio of more than 0.33, which falls in line with 
the 1/3 golden rule most often used by creditors.  Another variable is liquidityratio, which 
is the ratio of liquid assets, such as money in checking account, cash value of savings 
bonds, money in IRA, CDs and money market accounts, to monthly income. The binary 
recode is lowliquidity that is equal to 1 if a household has liquidity ratio that is lower than 
3, which indicates that household doesn’t have enough liquidity to cover 3 months living 
expenses, assuming that monthly income represents monthly living expenses. Apart from 
these, we also include behindpayments, which is equal to 1 if a household has ever fallen 




One of the important determinants of household attitude toward credit is income. 





nominal values are adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index for each SCF year 
included. Marital status (married), education in years (education), age of the household 
head (age), race (White) and employment status (employed) are other variables that are 
found to be significant determinants of household attitudes toward borrowing.  
The SCF identifies households that are dissuaded from applying for credit by asking 
the following question: “Was there any time in the past five years that you thought of 
applying for credit at a particular place, but changed your mind because you thought you 
might be turned down?” If a household said yes to this question, discouraged = 1. We think 
that discouragement might play a role in forming a negative attitude toward credit.  
The SCF also asks the following question in regards to households’ risk preference: 
“Which of the statements on this page comes closest to the amount of financial risk that 
you (and your [husband/wife/partner]) are willing to take when you save or make 
investments?” Among the possible answers are: “Take substantial financial risks expecting 
to earn substantial returns,” “Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above 
average returns,” “Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns,” “Not 
willing to take any financial risks.” If households are not willing to take any risk at all, 
riskaverse = 1. It is possible that risk averse households are more likely to form negative 
attitude toward borrowing. 
 
Hypotheses 
It has already been discussed earlier that there have been significant institutional 
changes in the U.S. financial markets that were deregulatory. With these institutional 
changes in place, U.S. households are expected to have more positive attitudes toward 





should be a positive determinant of attitudes toward borrowing. In a more formal way: 
Ceteris Paribus, indebted households are more likely to have positive attitudes toward 
borrowing (Hypothesis 1). However, the primary interest of this study is in the historical 
evolution of this correlation. Deregulation of the U.S. financial sector continued in the 
1990s and early 2000s. If there weren’t any catastrophic consequences of deregulation to 
the U.S. economy, one would expect the positive correlation between indebtedness and 
positive attitudes toward borrowing to get stronger. However, in the time period between 
1983 and 2013, the U.S. economy was hit by three economic recessions, the latest of which 
was the most severe recession since the Great Depression. Surely, these recessions had 
significant impacts on the correlation between indebtedness and attitudes toward 
borrowing. Then: Ceteris Paribus, the marginal effect of indebtedness on attitudes shifted 
during recessions (Hypothesis 2). 
 
Methodology 
Since we are after the effect of indebtedness on attitudes toward borrowing, 
attitudes can simply be written as a function of control variables and indebtedness, where 
𝑋 is the control variable, 𝑌 is the indebtedness variable, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 are year dummies and 
𝑌#𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 are interaction of indebtedness variables and years: 
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = 𝛽0𝑋 + 𝛽1𝑌 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 +  𝛽3𝑌#𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 + 𝜖                        (1) 
With the assumption that 𝜖 has a logistic distribution, we can estimate this equation 
using the logistic regression. However, Stata doesn’t allow the use of analytic weights 
together with logit regression. Therefore, the regression method used is the Generalized 
Linear Model (GLM) regression with the Logit Link Function. This way, we can easily use 







Imputation-adjusted estimations for weighted sample means are given in Table 1.   
Figure 8 demonstrates the change in households’ attitudes across years.  Note that there is 




Table 2 presents the estimation results of the GLM regression estimated for all the 
SCF waves in this study. 4 models are estimated using different definitions of indebtedness.  
Age is a significant factor in determining attitudes toward credit. Older age is 
associated with negative attitude. This result confirms generational differences in attitude 
toward credit pointed out by Cynamon and Fazzari (2008).  
Education is negatively associated with attitudes toward borrowing. Education is 
suspected to be correlated with income. 
Employment is positively associated with attitudes toward borrowing. Employment 
is again suspected to be highly correlated with income, which might be the culprit. 
Surprisingly, neither income nor networth is a significant factor in determining 
household attitude toward credit. This might be due to the possible multicollinearity 
mentioned above. 
Discouraged is another factor that is positively correlated with attitudes. It is 
counterintuitive that households that are discouraged to apply for credit are more likely to 
have positive attitudes toward borrowing. The only plausible explanation is that attitudes 








Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Weighed Sample of Households 
  1983 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Attitude 0.432 0.437 0.339 0.328 0.285 0.278 0.308 0.279 0.218 0.239 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age 48.354 49.545 49.865 49.936 50.113 50.559 51.202 51.601 52.059 52.686 
 (0.266) (0.302) (0.275) (0.261) (0.260) (0.250) (0.250) (0.253) (0.207) (0.216) 
White 0.837 0.759 0.760 0.783 0.785 0.770 0.740 0.751 0.710 0.706 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Married 0.635 0.600 0.588 0.595 0.602 0.613 0.592 0.598 0.594 0.584 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Education 12.217 12.464 12.883 12.930 13.081 13.145 13.304 13.273 13.416 13.495 
 (0.054) (0.071) (0.052) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.037) (0.036) 
Employed 0.681 0.679 0.657 0.680 0.704 0.717 0.711 0.698 0.677 0.658 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Discouraged 0.088 0.134 0.129 0.164 0.147 0.146 0.154 0.145 0.182 0.185 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Riskaverse 0.447 0.497 0.498 0.459 0.387 0.402 0.423 0.417 0.477 0.470 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Income 30.244 33.289 28.891 29.779 33.639 39.474 37.602 40.656 36.388 37.452 
 (0.841) (2.654) (0.983) (1.674) (2.442) (2.027) (1.786) (2.728) (1.698) (2.145) 
Networth 138.906 127.278 128.188 127.759 168.596 215.273 226.187 245.128 205.479 208.340 
 (14.074) (26.858) (12.989) (14.049) (18.310) (17.735) (20.015) (24.176) (17.869) (19.692) 
Insolvent 0.043 0.077 0.053 0.069 0.080 0.063 0.069 0.080 0.120 0.121 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Behindpayments 0.124 0.161 0.119 0.161 0.157 0.136 0.161 0.201 0.172 0.147 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highleverage 0.152 0.167 0.206 0.166 0.179 0.162 0.173 0.190 0.207 0.204 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Lowliquidity 0.650 0.619 0.619 0.633 0.599 0.590 0.609 0.592 0.623 0.618 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 






Figure 8. Percent of Households With Positive Credit Attitudes 











































Table 2. Results for GLM Estimation with Logit Link Function 
 (Dependent Variable: Attitude) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
White -0.352** -0.354** -0.353** -0.352** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Married 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Education -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed 0.147** 0.145** 0.144** 0.140** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Discouraged 0.158** 0.188** 0.169** 0.167** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
Riskaverse -0.184** -0.180** -0.180** -0.184** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Networth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Insolvent 0.314    
 (0.165)    
Behindpayments  0.030   
  (0.101)   
Highleverage   0.193*  
   (0.092)  
Lowliquidity    0.141 
    (0.073) 
1989.year 0.006 0.020 0.029 0.051 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) (0.078) 
1992.year -0.420** -0.413** -0.407** -0.314** 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.053) (0.081) 
1995.year -0.461** -0.450** -0.429** -0.530** 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.084) 
1998.year -0.664** -0.680** -0.667** -0.660** 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.084) 
2001.year -0.729** -0.707** -0.678** -0.778** 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.085) 
2004.year -0.580** -0.576** -0.542** -0.459** 
















Table 2. Continued 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
2007.year -0.720** -0.704** -0.688** -0.609** 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.080) 
2010.year -1.011** -1.025** -0.992** -0.823** 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) (0.086) 
2013.year -0.867** -0.836** -0.865** -0.632** 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.081) 
Indebtedness#1989 -0.121 -0.093 -0.146 -0.062 
 (0.199) (0.141) (0.123) (0.096) 
Indebtedness#1992 0.081 0.004 -0.073 -0.145 
 (0.212) (0.142) (0.120) (0.099) 
Indebtedness#1995 -0.155 -0.098 -0.217 0.098 
 (0.202) (0.133) (0.126) (0.101) 
Indebtedness#1998 -0.346 -0.023 -0.105 -0.028 
 (0.204) (0.136) (0.127) (0.102) 
Indebtedness#2001 0.000 -0.099 -0.261* 0.097 
 (0.205) (0.140) (0.131) (0.103) 
Indebtedness#2004 -0.049 -0.006 -0.198 -0.173 
 (0.200) (0.130) (0.123) (0.097) 
Indebtedness#2007 -0.098 -0.066 -0.168 -0.158 
 (0.196) (0.130) (0.123) (0.099) 
Indebtedness#2010 -0.508* -0.172 -0.336* -0.346** 
 (0.204) (0.144) (0.134) (0.107) 
Indebtedness#2013 -0.635** -0.612** -0.335** -0.450** 
 (0.200) (0.156) (0.128) (0.101) 
Constant 0.490** 0.531** 0.492** 0.412** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.086) (0.103) 
Observations 43,244 43,244 43,244 43,244 
Standard errors in parentheses 





is a good idea will apply for credit and might end up being discouraged. Therefore, 
discouraged households will have more positive attitude toward borrowing than 
households that didn’t apply for credit at all. Unfortunately, SCF doesn’t distinguish 
between households that didn’t apply at all and households that applied and weren’t 
discouraged.  
 Riskaverse is negatively associated with attitude, although it is not robust for all 
the waves. Other studies didn’t find a significant association of risk preference with attitude 
toward borrowing. Our results, on the other hand, suggest a weak correlation.   
The coefficients for year dummies indicate whether or not the intercept of the 
regression equation changes. In all years except 1989, and all 4 models, year dummies have 
negative and highly significant signs. It is evident that there is a significant structural shift 
in regression equations across years. It is also clear that the magnitude of this shift gets 
larger in 2001 and 2010 compared to preceding years. Remember that the 2001 wave 
roughly coincides with the Dot.com Recession and 2010 coincides with the Great 
Recession.  
 
Testing Hypothesis 1 
Model 1 uses insolvent as the definition of indebtedness. Although the coefficient 
has a positive sign, it is insignificant. Similar conclusions can be reached for Models 2 and 
4, which use behindpayments and lowliquidity. Highleverage in Model 3 is positively and 
significantly associated with positive attitudes. Therefore, we have partial support or the 
first hypothesis that claimed a positive correlation between indebtedness and attitudes. 






Testing Hypothesis 2 
 The interaction of indebtedness variables and year dummies tells us whether or not 
the effect of indebtedness on having positive attitudes changes across years compared to 
the base year of 1983. Note that negative coefficients mean that in any year the marginal 
effect of indebtedness on the probability of having positive attitude is smaller than it is in 
19839. In 2001 for Model 3, in 2010 for Models 1,3, and 4, and in 2013 for all models we 
see a negative change in the effect compared to the base year. It is evident that the negative 
marginal effect of indebtedness on having positive attitude was significantly stronger in 
2013 than in 1983, consistently so in all the models. In 2010, the same conclusion can be 
reached with the exception of Model 2, in which indebtedness was defined as 
behindpayments. Also in 2001, the marginal negative effect of highleverage appears to be 
stronger. In all the other years, we see a negative but insignificant change in the marginal 
effect. 
 To see if the shifts in the marginal effect of indebtedness in 2010 and 2013 were 
actually significant departures from previous years, the contrast of marginal effects in each 
consecutive year was calculated. Table 3 presents the results. Note that the only statistically 
significant change is in 2013 for Model 2. We can observe an increase in the marginal 
effects of 2010 after the recession, although this increase is not statistically significant. 
These results indicate that the shift in the marginal effects of indebtedness in 2010 and 
2013 is not due to the recession itself. The shift is a more deep-seated change that is 
observed when the comparison is with the 1983 effects. Nevertheless, there is no evidence  
 
                                                          
 
9In some years, the marginal effect of indebtedness is actually negative. Hence, negative interaction 





Table 3. Contrast of Predicted Margins for the Probability of Having Positive Attitude 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1989 vs 1983#Indebtedness -0.121 -0.093 -0.146 -0.062 
 (0.199) (0.141) (0.123) (0.096) 
1992 vs 1989#Indebtedness 0.201 0.098 0.072 -0.083 
 (0.173) (0.151) (0.114) (0.094) 
1995 vs 1992#Indedtedness -0.236 -0.103 -0.143 0.243* 
 (0.177) (0.131) (0.116) (0.098) 
1998 vs 1995#Indebtedness -0.191 0.075 0.111 -0.126 
 (0.169) (0.126) (0.124) (0.102) 
2001 vs 1998#Indebtedness 0.347* -0.076 -0.155 0.125 
 (0.172) (0.134) (0.128) (0.104) 
2004 vs 2001#Indebtedness -0.050 0.093 0.063 -0.270** 
 (0.167) (0.128) (0.124) (0.099) 
2007 vs 2004#Indebtedness -0.048 -0.059 0.029 0.015 
 (0.157) (0.115) (0.115) (0.095) 
2010 vs 2007#Indebtedness -0.410* -0.107 -0.168 -0.188 
 (0.162) (0.132) (0.127) (0.104) 
2013 vs 2010#Indebtedness -0.127 -0.439** 0.001 -0.104 
 (0.166) (0.155) (0.132) (0.106) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
to support Hypothesis 2. 
 
Conclusion 
U.S. households are not new to debt. They borrowed for sewing machines in the 
late 1800s, and then borrowed for household appliances, furniture, and automobiles in the 
first half of the 20th century (Olney, 1987). It was long before the 1980s that households 
purchased goods and services with credit cards. They didn’t buy homes on mortgages the 
very first time in the 1980s either. What was new to 1980s household finances is the 
breaking down of the perception of debt as a socioeconomic stigma. Since the 1980s, debt 
has become not only socially acceptable and legally forgivable, but also a promoted 
economic and social necessity. With all these institutional changes in place, one expects 





household attitudes, in that case, would be a natural outcome of the process that 
institutionalized debt in the United States. 
There are studies in the literature that find a strong association between attitude 
toward borrowing and debt. However, most of these studies rely on cross-section analysis. 
There is a longitudinal dimension to the correlation between debt and attitude toward 
borrowing. Households change their attitudes toward debt as they become more indebted. 
This longitudinal element is the reason there is likely a backward causality from debt to 
attitude. Households with positive attitudes toward debt borrow more. However, as they 
become more indebted in time, their attitudes are likely to be affected negatively. The 
decrease in the proportion of households with positive attitudes toward debt support this 
theory. The lack of longitudinal data collected from a nationally representative sample of 
households stands as the most important hurdle for detangling the complex endogenous 
relationship between indebtedness and attitudes toward debt.   
In this study, we investigated the correlation between indebtedness and attitude 
using 10 waves of the SCF. The long period of time these waves cover is an advantage in 
seeing the historical evolution of the relationship between household attitudes and 
indebtedness. By pooling the waves into a single dataset and introducing year dummies as 
well as interaction of indebtedness with years, we found evidence that highleverage and 
lowliquidity are associated with higher probability to state positive attitude toward 
borrowing. However, there was no evidence to support the second hypothesis about a 
significant change in the marginal effect of indebtedness on attitudes. The structural change 
appears to be a longer-term one, that can be seen from the significant coefficients of 





viewing debt more negatively. Also, this negative attitude toward borrowing was 
strengthened after the financial crisis. 
The limitations to this study are twofold. First of all, we didn’t address the 
endogeneity between indebtedness and household attitudes. Although we can blame lack 
of longitudinal data for this negligence, it doesn’t change the fact that endogeneity will 
reduce the accuracy of our estimations. Second, due to the pooled nature of the dataset 
used, sampling variability could not be corrected via using bootstrapped replicate weights 
published by SCF only for the years 1989 and onwards. Therefore, significance levels of 






INDEBTEDNESS AND HOUSEHOLD HEALTH: 
 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
American health has been worsening despite rising health care spending and an 
economy that has almost doubled its real output since the 1990s. Although a brief look at 
mortality and morbidity rates would make us think otherwise, the recent surge in the 
prevalence of chronic diseases shows that U.S. households are living less healthy lives 
(Bodenheimer, Chen, & Bennett, 2009; Ward & Schiller 2013, Ward, Schiller, & 
Goodman, 2014). A straightforward explanation for this chronic problem in the United 
States could be the aging of the population. However, one piece of evidence goes against 
this reasoning. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) publish summary tables for the 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) dating back to 1962. One of the questions in the 
survey collects information on the “respondent-assessed” health status. Since 1997, the 
results are reported with respect to age groups (see Figure 9). In 1997, 73.6% of 
respondents between age 18 and 44 reported excellent or good health. This share was 
58.5% for the group between ages 45 and 64 and 43.3% for ages 65 to 74 (Blackwell, 
Collins, & Coles, 2002). According to the 2014 report, for age group 18-44, the percentage 
of respondents with excellent or good health stayed at a relatively stable rate of 72.1% 
(Blackwell, Villarroel, & Clarke, 2015). However, the percentage decreased to 54.5% for 
the age group 45-64. What is striking is that for the senior group between ages 65 and 74, 






Figure 9. Adults With Excellent/Very Good Health Status 
*National Health Interview Survey, 1997-2014 
 
perceptions go, the senior population is feeling healthier in the United States.10 The same 
summary tables also indicate that for the entire sample of households, self-assessed health 
status has been worsening. Aging of the U.S. population could be a straightforward 
explanation to this downward trend in self assessed health status. However, changing 
socioeconomic circumstances is also a likely suspect here.    
The correlation between SES and health is a complex one. The first layer of 
complexity arises due to the endogenous correlation between SES and health. From a micro 
perspective, most of the health disparities among households can be explained by SES, 
however the causality runs both ways (Gallo & Matthews, 2003). Low SES can be both 
                                                          
 
10The difference between proportions in consecutive years is statistically significant at 0.01% with 

















the cause and the effect of worsening health. Another level of complexity appears as a 
result of the counter-cyclical nature of household health. In a series of studies Christopher 
J. Ruhm (2003, 2004, 2007), as well as Ruhm and Black (2002) demonstrated that 
household health deteriorates during economic expansions either because of added stress 
of work or because of unhealthy consumption patterns such as increased alcohol 
consumption. It is important to note that Ruhm was mainly interested in physical health. 
The possibility that physical health and mental health might not follow a similar pattern 
adds more complexity to the relationship between health and SES. As a matter of fact, 
looking at the NHIS early release table for serious psychological stress (Ward, Clarke, 
Nugent, & Schiller, 2016, p. 86, Figure 13.1) one can identify a counter-cyclical trend in 
the percentage of adults who experienced serious psychological distress during the past 30 
days. Bad economic times might mean better physical health for households, but it also 
appears that they suffer from more stress.  
One key element in the relationship between SES and health has been studied only 
recently. The Great Recession exposed a crucial weakness of the US economy: high 
leverage. The economic disaster caused by the default of the subprime mortgage industry 
undoubtedly spread to millions of American households who lost their homes, jobs, and 
retirement funds and were left with a high debt burden. It is this liability and the difficulty 
households experienced in paying it that attracted scholars to investigate the relationship 
between household debt and health.  
This study contributes to that literature by looking at the debt-health nexus with a 
historical analysis. We use the public dataset of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 





study is the only study in the literature that covers a timespan this long using the SCF. We 
test two hypotheses. First, we will investigate whether or not there is a stable relationship 
between household health and its covariates across these years. Then, we will see whether 
the effect of indebtedness on household health changes across years, especially during the 
three recessionary periods. The main contribution of this paper, other than the long time 
span it covers, is the testing of this second hypothesis. Any evidence for a structural change 
in the correlation between indebtedness and household health will indicate that changing 
financial and economic conditions influence how households’ wellbeing is related to their 
finances.   
The rest of the paper is planned to first lay out the logical framework for the debt-
health nexus by presenting findings from other studies in the literature. A section 
explaining the data and variables, as well as the methodology used, will follow that. Next, 




Consumption and asset building are the two reasons a household borrows. 
Borrowing for the purpose of purchasing consumption goods gives households an instant 
gratification; it is therefore likely to improve their health status by lowering their stress. 
An important thing to note is that some consumption might be “unhealthy” such as alcohol 
consumption, smoking, or foods high in sugar and saturated fat. Borrowing for asset 
building is also expected to affect health positively by improving access to better housing. 
If we include vehicle purchases in asset building as well, then the positive health affect can 





regular mortgage payments and also make sure the property is maintained properly. There 
are negative health consequences associated with vehicle ownership as well. First and 
foremost, traffic injuries might lower health status for drivers compared to households who 
employ public transportation. Also, driving in a densely-populated area is a highly stressful 
activity, which might lower perceived level of health. Therefore, net health effects of, not 
the borrowing itself, but the final goods or services purchased are ambiguous. (Hennessy 
& Wiesenthal, 1997; Stokols, Novaco, & Stokols, 1978).  
Debt repayment has less ambiguous effects on household health. In the case of an 
income loss, households are more likely to face delinquency on loan payments. 
Delinquency alone is a stress factor because of the social stigma of not being able to repay 
debt. Moreover, delinquency can quickly add more to a household’s debt burden through 
interest charges and fees. A household that is delinquent on a loan has to either sell the 
collateral to repay the debt or keep on making payments by means of a refinance, which 
would require the household to make certain concessions in their budget. Selling the asset 
might have negative health effects by creating added stress for households. For instance, 
moving is a stressful ordeal for any family under any circumstances. Not wanting to go 
through that ordeal, a household might choose to repay the debt. That requires making 
room for loan payments in the household budget. That might mean cutting back on healthy 
food and utilizing less health care especially when the high cost of health care is considered. 
This will lower the health status of households. Note that it is possible that a household 
might also cut back on unhealthy consumption, which might induce better health. Another 
source of stress is predatory debt collection many households are subjected to during 





debt can affect health. 
 
Wealth and Health 
Adam, Hurd, and McFadden (2003) investigated the relationship between SES and 
health including wealth as a measure of SES. This study used AHEAD (Asset and Health 
Dynamics of the Oldest Old) as its dataset, which limits the scope their research to a panel 
of U.S elderly at age 70 or older in 1993. Their conclusion suggested that there is no causal 
link from SES to mortality and acute diseases. However, there was evidence for a causal 
link from SES to incidence of mental problems. Endogeneity between health and wealth 
was recognized in this study, although the evidence for a causal link from health to wealth 
changes was less compelling. 
Meer, Miller, and Rosen (2003) used the PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) 
to explain the causal relationship between wealth and health. They found a weak causality 
running from wealth to health when they control for the endogeneity between the two.  
In a more recent study, Wenzlow, Mullahy, Robert, and Wolfe (2004) studied the 
health-wealth nexus using the SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances). They investigated the 
correlation between family-size-adjusted household wealth and a self-reported 
dichotomous health measure. In the SCF, households are asked to rate their health status 
by indicating if their health is poor, fair, good, or excellent. The answers to this question 
are reworked into a binary variable by combining poor/fair and good/excellent values 
together. Control variables are age, race, gender, marital status, education, time preference, 
and smoking of the household head apart from household income. The results show that 
there is strong positive correlation between household wealth and health status. The wealth 





on health gets weaker for households at the higher levels of the wealth distribution. Another 
result that is noteworthy is that wealth is differentially related to health depending on age, 
which appears to be more prominent for Whites.  
Brown, Taylor, and Price (2005) tested the hypothesis that household debt is 
associated with increased levels of psychological distress using the 1995 and 2000 waves 
of the British Household Panel Survey. Unlike the previous work, this study looked at 
household assets and debt separately. They further dissected debt into secured and 
unsecured debt to see if the health effects are diverse. Authors of this study also took into 
account the possible endogeneity between health and debt and adjust their models 
accordingly. The results were compelling. First of all, outstanding debt of any kind was 
strongly associated with lower psychological wellbeing. Unsecured debt had a stronger 
effect on health than secured debt, which was mortgage debt in this case. However, the 
negative effect of debt was offset by the positive effect of household saving on 
psychological wellbeing. Note that the measure for saving didn’t include possible changes 
in the value of assets such as an increase in house equity.     
 
From Delinquency to Health  
Studies on the link between delinquency and health attempt to reveal the 
mechanism through which high indebtedness might affect household health. Measures of 
indebtedness as well as health indicators for households vary greatly. The most common 
denominator is the clear distinction between physical and mental health.  
Nettleton and Burrows (1998) is the earliest study we reviewed. Their focus was on 
the correlation between mortgage indebtedness and mental health of the British households 





same measure that was also used by Brown et al. (2005). The mortgage indebtedness was 
again a self-reported indicator of whether or not the household had problems making 
mortgage payments, in other words mortgage delinquency. They found evidence that there 
is a link between mortgage delinquency and worsening mental health. 
Drentea and Lavrakas (2000) focused on credit card debt and its effects on physical 
and self-reported health. They used a survey of more than 900 representative adults that 
were randomly interviewed in Ohio in 1997. This study stands out as one of the few studies 
that looked at objective and subjective measures of health independently. Their particular 
focus on credit card debt is important because credit card debt is unsecured, delinquency 
most often results in aggressive collection, and is also socially stigmatized. Although they 
found evidence for the correlation of both subjective and self-reported health with credit 
card to income ratio, some of this correlation can be explained by health behaviors such as 
smoking, eating, and drinking. Yet still, stress caused by delinquency appears to explain 
some of the correlation. Drentea (2000) focused on this aspect of the debt-health nexus and 
found that anxiety increases with credit card debt to income ratio and being in default. 
One study that finds partial evidence for a link between debt and health is by Lyons 
and Yilmazer (2005). They focused on the endogenous nature of the correlation between 
poor health and financial strain using SCF. Being in financial strain was defined in three 
ways:  delinquency on loans, having an asset to loans ratio less than 1, and having a liquid 
asset to income ratio less than 0.25. They found that poor health results in financial strain 
that is robust for different definitions of financial strain. However, the backward causality 
from financial strain to health couldn’t be supported by any evidence. 





and 2005. They also focused their attention on the bidirectional causality between 
indebtedness and psychological stress. They also analyzed objective and subjective 
measures of financial stress. The subjective measure of financial stress was determined by 
households’ perception of their financial difficulties in the survey. Although there seems 
to be a weak relationship between objective measures of financial strain and depression, 
objective financial stress plays a role through households’ perceived level of financial 
difficulty. Key drivers of depression onset were these general perceptions of financial 
stress, losing employment, and worsening ill-health. Similarly, Sweet, Nandi, Adam, and 
McDade (2013) reported that a high debt to asset ratio is associated with higher self-
assessed stress and depression, lower self-reported general health, and also higher levels of 
diastolic blood pressure. They use the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health 
as their dataset, therefore their sample was restricted to young adults. 
Another study that investigated the mediating factors in the correlation between 
financial strain and mental health is by Selenko and Batinic (2011). Their results suggested 
that perceived financial strain was correlated with mental health, whereas objective 
financial strain measured as the level of debt was not. They also found that being part of a 
collective purpose through employment as well as self-efficacy moderated the negative 
effects of perceived financial strain on mental health. 
In an interesting paper, Richardson, Elliott, and Roberts (2013) reviewed 65 
systematically selected studies and found that 51 of these studies concluded that debt is 
associated with worse health. A few other studies found an association of worry for debt 
with health, and a couple more concluded that financial strain, rather than debt, was 





most of the studies find that unsecured debt is linked to poor health.  
 
From Health to Delinquency  
As pointed out earlier, many studies recognize the endogenous relationship 
between financial stress and health. Worse health can be both the result and the effect of 
financial difficulties. Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren, and Wollhandler (2009) found that 
medical related bankruptcies rose by 49.6% between 2001 and 2007. Most of this rise can 
be attributed to either medical debt or income loss due to illness. They also added that most 
of these medical debtors were well-educated homeowners employed in middle-class 
occupations who had health insurance. Mathur, in two congressional testimonies, 
concluded that it was not the medical debt but other debt holdings of these households that 
led to their bankruptcy (Medical Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans? 
2000, Medical Debt: Can Bankruptcy Reform Facilitate a Fresh Start? 2000). It is true that 
households with high medical debt also carry a heavier load of other types of debt. 
However, what is triggering bankruptcies is more likely to be their medical debt, which is 
usually accumulated after acute health conditions that were unexpected expenditures on 
top of already existing debt burden. Another issue with Mathur’s argument is that 
nowadays most medical debt is disguised as credit card debt. If a household is filing for 
bankruptcy due to high credit card debt, that might very well be because of a medical 
expense. Nevertheless, it is crucial to identify catastrophic health expenses when analyzing 
the link between health and delinquency, because the causality is likely to run from health 









Jacoby (2002) provided a short review of the debt-health literature and also 
analyzed how the law can be a mitigating factor in that correlation. Informal collection 
methods, which are highly unregulated in the US, stood out as a major source of stress for 
financially delinquent households. It was also indicated in that study that the government 
encouraged indebtedness through various tax policies and low-cost public lending, which 
eventually made it ever easier for households to get under heavy debt loads. 
 
Health Behaviors  
Another factor that links indebtedness to health is the change in health behaviors 
when households face financial strain. Chen and Miller (2013) explained various casual 
factors that determine health disparities among different SES groups. If we count 
indebtedness a part of household SES, then indebtedness will first of all determine the 
neighborhood you are living in. The credit rationing literature finds evidence for how 
highly-indebted households relative to their income will have difficulty obtaining credit. 
This might mean not being able to afford a mortgage and therefore not living in a desired 
neighborhood. Certain neighborhoods are deprived of access to healthy living standards 
such as fresh food, or even clean water as seen in the Flint, MI water crisis. Violence is 
another factor that will have health consequences as Chen and Miller pointed out. Moving 
on to household level links, Chen and Miller explained the spillover of neighborhood 
effects on parenting. What might be added to their reasoning is that parenting can also be 
affected if a household is facing a financial crisis. Parents are likely to reallocate their time 
towards longer work hours in order to pay debt back, which will result in health problems 





the individual level.  
The impact of indebtedness on health behaviors was also documented by Turunen 
and Hiilamo (2014) in their systematic review of 33 peer-reviewed studies on the debt-
health topic. First of all, the source of debt as well as the kind can have diverse health 
effects on households. Indebtedness appears to also leave an impact on health behaviors. 
Moreover, household debt stands as a significant mediator of suicidal tendencies. Debt 
seems to have a more indirect impact on physical health than mental health. Household 
mental health is directly affected negatively by the financial stress through depressive 
symptoms. Physical health, on the other hand, is indirectly affected by poor health 
decisions, worsening access to healthy environments, and cuts on health care.   
 
Crises and Health 
Economic shocks are usually unexpected and can have deleterious effects on 
household finances. As in the case of the Great Recession, many households experience 
significant losses in their wealth after an economic crisis. Combined with loss of income 
due to unemployment or pay cuts, these wealth losses will get under the skin sooner or 
later. However, as noted earlier, there is evidence in the literature that households’ health 
actually improves during bad economic times (ala Ruhm, 2003, 2004, 2007). Below we 
will present studies that contest that evidence and try to bring another dimension to how 
the Great Recession might have affected household health.  
The psychological toll the 2008 recession took on U.S. households can be observed 
looking at the study by Lin, Ketcham, Rosenquist, and Simon (2013). This longitudinal 
study investigated the impact of the decline in housing prices between December 2004 and 





65 years old in 2009. Results indicate a significant correlation between declining housing 
prices and increasing prescription claims for this age-restricted sample. Similarly, 
McInerney, Mellor, and Nicholas (2013) found in the 2008 Health and Retirement Study 
that large wealth losses were associated with increased mental distress and antidepressant 
use. This effect was larger for households with higher levels of stock holding, who 
experienced the largest decrease in their wealth. It is important to note that this significant 
effect only exists for subjective measures of mental health, but disappears for clinically-
validated, objective measures. Yilmazer, Babiarz and Liu (2015) found similar evidence 
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the 2007-2011 period. They concluded that 
a decrease in housing wealth relative to total wealth is associated with increased 
psychological distress and higher rates of depression.  
I discussed earlier that physical health is indirectly affected by indebtedness 
through changes in health behaviors. However, Yilmazer et al. (2015) pointed out that there 
was limited evidence to support the claim that changes in household wealth had any impact 
on health behaviors after the 2008 recession. This result is actually in accord with the view 
that the relationship between economic activity and health is counter-cyclical. However, 
Tekin, McClellan, and Minyard (2013) used the data from the (BRFSS) Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System in the period 2005-2011 to find evidence contrary to that view. 
Their conclusion was that the counter-cyclical relationship between economic activity and 
health disappeared after the Great Recession. One factor that likely caused this change in 
pattern is an increase in involuntary changes in health behaviors after the recession. These 
involuntary changes in health behaviors are usually caused by restricted access to healthy 





of five different health behaviors (smoking, checking food labels, buying food based on 
labels, wearing a seatbelt, and frequency of vigorous exercise) in a longitudinal dataset that 
covers two years, 2005 and 2009. After controlling for prerecession health behaviors, age, 
gender, marital status, and educational attainment, they found that financial strain (defined 
as a five-point scale depending on respondents’ answers to three questions in the survey) 
was significantly associated with these five health behaviors. On the contrary, neither the 
number of hours worked nor the change in employment status had any influence on health 
behaviors.   
In a recent study, Wilkinson (2016) looked at a sample of respondents from the 
Health and Retirement Study between 2006 and 2010 to investigate the effects of 
worsening financial wellbeing on mental health during the Great Recession. Results 
indicate that subjective financial strain can robustly explain worsening anxiety and 
depression symptoms during that 4-year period.  
 
Data and Methodology 
Data were taken from the 11 waves of SCF since 1983 to the most current survey 
year in 2013. The SCF is a triennial survey sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and 
was conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan from 1983 to 
1989 and by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago since 1992. 
Currently, it stands as the survey that collects the most detailed information on US 
households’ finances as well as financial opinions. However, because of the nature of 
surveys that rely on self-reporting of variables, SCF used imputation techniques to fill out 
missing observations for these crucial variables. 





missing observations are imputed for dollar variables. Up until 1989, SCF employed single 
imputation techniques. 1989 onwards multiple imputation techniques have been used in 
SCF to impute missing observations.11 If not accounted for, multiple imputation can inflate 
variances for estimates, causing false inference for both descriptive statistics and regression 
analysis. This is also called “imputation error” (Kennickell, 1998). Necessary corrections 
have to be applied to the multiply imputed data to avoid bias (Montalto & Yuh, 1998). 
The other problem with SCF is called “sampling variability error.”12 Due to privacy 
concerns, SCF doesn’t release crucial details on households that are necessary for 
resampling. However, as an alternative, SCF publishes replicate weights 1989 onwards.  
Thankfully, there is a written macro in Stata called scfcombo that allows researchers 
to correct for both imputation and sampling variability error easily. However, for this 
macro to work, there has to be replicate weights available. Because the waves prior to 1989 
don’t have replicate weights, it is impossible to employ this Stata tool when all the waves 
including 1983 and 1986 are pooled together.  
An alternative is to employ Stata’s mi estimation. This requires defining the pooled 
data as imputed data. The difficulty is that waves prior to 1989 are imputed with single 
imputation techniques. Luckily, Stata can be easily fooled into thinking that singly imputed 
data are actually multiply imputed by merging 5 identical sets into a single set.  
The following estimates for descriptive statistics, coefficients, and marginal 
probabilities are all corrected for imputation error. Note that, given the pooled nature of 
the data, it is not possible to correct for the sampling variability error.  
                                                          
 
11Please see Montalto and Sung (1996) for an easy to read discussion on multiple imputation in SCF. 
 





Self-Reported Health Status 
SCF also collects information on household head’s health by asking the following 
question: “Would you say your (husband/wife/partner/spouse)'s health in general is 
excellent, good, fair, or poor?” The answers are recoded into a dichotomous health status 
variable, which is equal to 1 if the household head has excellent or good health, and is 
equal to 0 otherwise. Note that there are few cases when the respondent is not the household 
head, but the spouse. In those cases, the spouse is reporting on head’s health status. But in 
the majority of cases, household heads are reporting on their health status themselves. The 
validity of self-reported health measures has been long discussed in the literature and there 
is a consensus on their consistency as a health measure given the accuracy of self-reported 
health status as a predictor of mortality (McGee, Youlian, Guichan, & Copper, 1999). 
However, it is still considered a subjective measure and is not a good reflection of more 
objective measures that rely on physical health. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
self-reported health will reflect more of the respondent’s psychological health than the 
actual physical health of households.  
 
Indebtedness 
 The indebtedness variables are the same ones used in the previous part of this study 
following the literature on this subject (DeVaney, 1994; DeVaney & Lytton, 1995; Garrett 
& James, 2013; Greninger et al., 1996; Kim & Lyons, 2008). First, we have insolvent, 
which is equal to 1 if a household has a solvency ratio (total asset / total debt) below 1. 
Another measure used is highleverage, which is equal to 1 if a household has a monthly 
debt-to-income ratio of more than 0.33. The third measure is lowliquidity that is equal to 1 





which indicates that household doesn’t have enough liquidity to cover 3 months living 
expenses, assuming that monthly income represents monthly living expenses. Apart from 
these, we also include behindpayments, which is equal to 1 if a household has ever fallen 
behind any loan payment. 
 
Control Factors 
When looking at the effects of indebtedness on household health, we will control 
for household head’s age, marital status, education, race, and employment status as well as 
household gross income and net worth. Note that nominal values are adjusted for inflation 
using the consumer price index for each SCF year included.  
 
Hypotheses 
 Previous literature shows that the relationship between household health and 
indebtedness is a complex one. The complexity rises mostly due to the endogenous nature 
of the correlation. On one hand, debt and the resulting indebtedness is the only way some 
households can gain access to health care. On the other hand, persistent indebtedness of 
some households affects their physical and mental wellbeing. The SCF, because of its 
cross-sectional nature, provides no benefit in regards to this endogeneity issue. On the other 
hand, the strength of the data employed in this study is the long time span covered. With a 
pooled cross section of all the waves of SCF since 1983, it is possible to make a historical 
analysis to see if there have been significant structural shifts across years, especially in 
regards to the correlation between indebtedness and health status. First of all, we test if 
there is a negative association between indebtedness and household health: Ceteris paribus, 





we are interested in a possible structural change in this correlation. Therefore, we claim: 
Ceteris paribus, the marginal effect of indebtedness on household health has shifted across 
years (Hypothesis 2a). Especially during crises, we expect indebtedness to have a stronger 
negative effect on household health due to predatory collection and reallocation of funds 
away from healthy choices. Finally, we want to see if economic recessions had any impact 
on household health. Remember, studies by Christopher Ruhm suggest that households 
enjoy positive health changes during recessionary periods. If his claims are true, then we 
should observe significant positive effects of year dummies for 1992, 2001, and 2010, 
which should pick up any exogenous changes to the regression equations in these years. In 
other words: Ceteris paribus, there was an upward shift in the regression of household 
health in 1992, 2001, and 2010 compared to previous years (Hypothesis 2b). 
 
Methodology 
Since we are after the effect of indebtedness on household health status, 
healthstatus can simply be written as a function of control variables and indebtedness, 
where 𝑋 are the control variables, 𝑌 is the indebtedness variable, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 are year dummies 
and 𝑌#𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 are the interactions of indebtedness variables and years: 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 = 𝛽0𝑋 + 𝛽1𝑌 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 +  𝛽3𝑌#𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 + 𝜖                   (2) 
With the assumption that 𝜖 has a logistic distribution we can estimate this equation 
using the logistic regression. However, Stata doesn’t allow the use of analytic weights 
together with logit regression. Therefore, the regression method used is Generalized Linear 
Model (GLM) regression with Logit Link Function. This way, we can easily use the 








Imputation adjusted estimations for weighted sample means are given in Table 4. 
The total drop in the proportion of households with excellent/good health from 1983 to 
2013 is 4 percentage points. Testing this difference in proportions gives us a standard 
normal test statistic of 4.342, which is significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Graphical Analysis 
Before moving on the estimation results, we will visually demonstrate the 
correlation between indebtedness and household health with respect to age, income and net 
worth of households. Note that the calculation of net worth and income quintiles are based 
on the average of five implicates for each observation. Age group, on the other hand, is 
calculated from only the first implicate. The sample is weighed with the analytical weights 
provided in the survey.  
 
Age Gradient of Indebtedness-Health Nexus 
 Figures 10-13 demonstrate the correlation between indebtedness and health status 
across 3 different age groups and 4 different measures of indebtedness. The first important 
thing to point out is the notable decline in the proportion of households with excellent/good 
health in the youngest age group for all definitions except lowliquidity. Regardless of the 
indebtedness status, young households have experienced deteriorating health, which makes 
us think that indebtedness might not be the reason. However, when indebtedness is defined 
as having low liquidity, the proportion drops noticeably only in 2013 for households 








 Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Weighed Sample of Households 
 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Healthstatus 0.760 0.791 0.747 0.748 0.752 0.758 0.750 0.743 0.740 0.731 0.720 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age 48.680 50.356 49.545 49.865 49.936 50.113 50.559 51.202 51.601 52.059 52.686 
 (0.264) (0.309) (0.302) (0.275) (0.261) (0.260) (0.250) (0.250) (0.253) (0.207) (0.216) 
White 0.833 0.844 0.759 0.760 0.783 0.785 0.770 0.740 0.751 0.710 0.706 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Married 0.629 0.631 0.600 0.588 0.595 0.602 0.613 0.592 0.598 0.594 0.584 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Education 12.134 12.403 12.464 12.883 12.930 13.081 13.145 13.304 13.273 13.416 13.495 
 (0.054) (0.059) (0.071) (0.052) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.037) (0.036) 
Employed 0.673 0.625 0.679 0.657 0.680 0.704 0.717 0.711 0.698 0.677 0.658 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Income 30.075 30.523 33.289 28.891 29.779 33.639 39.474 37.602 40.656 36.388 37.452 
 (0.847) (1.175) (2.654) (0.983) (1.674) (2.442) (2.027) (1.786) (2.728) (1.698) (2.145) 
Networth 140.110 154.638 127.278 128.188 127.759 168.596 215.273 226.187 245.128 205.479 208.340 
 (14.275) (19.617) (26.858) (12.989) (14.049) (18.310) (17.735) (20.015) (24.176) (17.869) (19.692) 
Insolvent 0.045 0.036 0.077 0.053 0.069 0.080 0.063 0.069 0.080 0.120 0.121 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Behindpayments 0.122 0.098 0.161 0.119 0.161 0.157 0.136 0.161 0.201 0.172 0.147 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highleverage 0.154 0.110 0.167 0.206 0.166 0.179 0.162 0.173 0.190 0.207 0.204 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Lowliquidity 0.655 0.608 0.619 0.619 0.633 0.599 0.590 0.609 0.592 0.623 0.618 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
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liquidity problems, we see a notable decline, regardless of the age group they belong to. A 
similar widening of the health gap between indebted and not-indebted households can be 
observed for behindpayments and highleverage measures to a lesser extend in 1998 and 
onwards. Once other factors are taken into account, we suspect that this gap will not be 
statistically significant for these two measures.  
 
Income Gradient of Indebtedness-Health Nexus 
 Figures 14-17 demonstrate the correlation between indebtedness and health status 
across 5 income quintiles and 4 different measures of indebtedness. The positive 
correlation between household income and health status is quite evident in every year. We 
are particularly interested in the relationship between indebtedness and the proportion of 
households with excellent/good health. For the first three definitions of indebtedness we 
see that the proportion is higher among the indebted households that are in the lowest 
income quintile. This indicates that for the poorest households, good health is only possible 
with indebtedness. This trend disappears as household climb up in the income ladder and 
can’t be observed for lowliquidity. In regards to the health gap, we don’t see a notable 
difference between insolvent and solvent households as well as households that are behind 
payments and those that are current. However, for the other two definitions of 
indebtedness, we see a widening of the gap 1998 onwards. It might not be a coincidence 
that households are affected significantly from indebtedness in a period of financial boom. 
 
Net Worth Gradient of the Indebtedness-Health Nexus 
Figures 18-20 demonstrate the correlation between indebtedness and health status 
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is omitted from these figures because of the direct collinearity between insolvent and 
networth.13 First thing to notice is the very gradual net worth gradient of household health 
status. Regardless of the indebtedness status, there are more households in the upper 
quintiles of the net worth distribution that report good health, but gradually so. For instance, 
the proportion of households with good health is virtually the same in any year for both the 
second and the third quintile households. Another noticeable trend is that only for the 
lowliquidity definition of indebtedness, we can observe the widening health gap after 1998, 
mostly due to the fact that health status of households in the lowest quintile with no 




Table 5 presents the results of the GLM estimation using Logit link function for all 
waves of the SCF. Four models are estimated using different measures of indebtedness. 
Age is a significant predictor of health status. Higher age is associated with lower 
probability of reporting positive health status. This is confirming what Figures 10-13 
already demonstrated: There is a negative correlation between age and health status that is 
consistent across all years.  
White is also a strong predictor of the probability to report excellent/good health. 
White households are significantly more likely to report positive health status than non-
White households. This result can be attributed to differences in health behaviors (healthy 
eating habits, regular exercise, alcohol and tobacco consumption, etc.) and health  
                                                          
 




Table 5. Results for GLM Estimation With Logit Link Function  
(Dependent Variable: Healthstatus) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age -0.014** -0.014** -0.013** -0.016** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
White 0.172** 0.168** 0.174** 0.132** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Married -0.140** -0.131** -0.140** -0.122** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
Education 0.117** 0.118** 0.116** 0.110** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed 1.033** 1.049** 1.041** 1.041** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Income 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.022** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Networth 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Insolvent 0.253    
 (0.203)    
Behindpayments  -0.117   
 
 (0.128)   
Highleverage   0.109  
 
  (0.113)  
Lowliquidity    -0.189* 
 
   (0.092) 
1986 0.286** 0.275** 0.298** 0.576** 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.065) (0.107) 
1989 -0.067 -0.145* -0.102 0.164 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.103) 
1992 -0.098 -0.104 -0.091 -0.007 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.064) (0.100) 
1995 -0.090 -0.108 -0.108 0.121 
 (0.059) (0.062) (0.063) (0.100) 
1998 -0.126* -0.127* -0.196** -0.006 
 (0.059) (0.062) (0.064) (0.099) 
2001 -0.232** -0.204** -0.221** 0.129 
 (0.060) (0.063) (0.065) (0.102) 
2004 -0.340** -0.295** -0.309** 0.143 
 (0.057) (0.060) (0.063) (0.102) 
2007 -0.268** -0.272** -0.255** 0.051 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.062) (0.100) 
2010 -0.257** -0.247** -0.272** 0.072 
 (0.057) (0.060) (0.062) (0.100) 
2013 -0.281** -0.290** -0.318** -0.063 





Table 5. Continued 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Indebtedness#1986 -0.161 0.022 -0.130 -0.426** 
 (0.283) (0.194) (0.161) (0.128) 
Indebtedness#1989 -0.742** 0.143 -0.144 -0.417** 
 (0.236) (0.175) (0.148) (0.124) 
Indebtedness#1992 -0.285 -0.088 -0.122 -0.150 
 (0.258) (0.175) (0.141) (0.123) 
Indebtedness#1995 -0.540* -0.106 -0.103 -0.341** 
 (0.242) (0.166) (0.144) (0.121) 
Indebtedness#1998 -0.533* -0.195 0.109 -0.214 
 (0.238) (0.161) (0.146) (0.120) 
Indebtedness#2001 -0.436 -0.346* -0.203 -0.542** 
 (0.243) (0.160) (0.143) (0.123) 
Indebtedness#2004 -0.361 -0.334* -0.255 -0.649** 
 (0.240) (0.153) (0.138) (0.121) 
Indebtedness#2007 -0.549* -0.113 -0.262 -0.459** 
 (0.232) (0.155) (0.138) (0.119) 
Indebtedness#2010 -0.394 -0.179 -0.099 -0.463** 
 (0.225) (0.151) (0.135) (0.119) 
Indebtedness#2013 -0.461* -0.175 -0.057 -0.331** 
 (0.222) (0.153) (0.133) (0.116) 
Constant -0.775** -0.743** -0.800** -0.359** 
 (0.087) (0.089) (0.090) (0.110) 
Observations 46,157 46,157 46,157 46,157 
Standard errors in parentheses 














environments (neighborhood factors such as accessibility of healthy food, air and water 
quality, etc.). Another strong predictor of household health is employment. Being 
employed, whether full-time or part-time, has a positive impact on the probability of 
household health. Besides increasing purchasing power of households (which is controlled 
through income), employment can have a positive impact on health by providing household 
with low-cost, employer offered health insurance. However, there is an even more 
important possible effect of employment on household health by increasing psychological 
wellbeing of the employed (Ross & Mirowsky, 1995). However, it is also possible that this 
positive correlation is simply due to the selection of healthy households to find and keep 
jobs. 
Education is another positive factor determining household health. Better educated 
households have a higher probability of reporting positive health status. Also, education is 
the only control factor that might have relevance to health behaviors. Earlier we discussed 
how health behaviors play a mediating role in the relationship between indebtedness and 
physical health. Education, because of its direct effect on household choices, is capturing 
some of the behavioral aspect of the household health. However, there is still a big portion 
of health behaviors that can’t be explained with years of education that might be linked to 
financial strain. Unfortunately, SCF doesn’t collect information on health behaviors that is 
consistent across waves.14 
Income and networth are both significant predictors of household health. Overall, 
these results are in accord with the SES-Health literature, which mostly finds a positive 
                                                          
 
14There is a question in the SCF about whether or not household head is a smoker, which has been 




association of household health with SES.  
 
Testing Hypothesis 1 
 Neither of the indebtedness measures, except lowliquidity, is significantly 
associated with healthstatus. Lowliquidity, on the other hand, is negatively associated with 
household health. We find partial support for the first hypothesis that is not robust for 
different measures of indebtedness. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 2a 
 In the first three models, the interaction of indebtedness measures and year 
dummies are mostly insignificant for the first three models. This was expected after seeing 
how indebtedness measures were not significantly associated with healthstatus in those 
three models. However, in Model 4, we see mostly significant coefficients for the 
interaction terms. This indicates a statistically significant change in the effect of 
lowliquidity on healthstatus from the base year of 1983.  
 To put things in perspective, we calculated the contrast of predictive margin in each 
year to the predictive margin in the previous year. Table 6 demonstrates the results. 
Negative values mean in that year, the negative effect of indebtedness on the probability 
of success (reporting excellent/good health) is stronger compared to the previous year. 
There are only five instances the contrast is significant. The first couple are in Model 1 
between 1986 and 1989, and between 1989 and 1992, the latter of which is positive. This 
means that the marginal effect of insolvency on the probability of reporting positive health 
is smaller in 1992 than it is in 1989. Given the fact that the effect of insolvency was not 




Table 6. Contrast of Predicted Margins for the Probability of Having Positive Health 
when Indebtedness = 1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1986 vs 1983#indebtedness -0.161 0.022 -0.130 -0.426 
 (0.283) (0.194) (0.161) (0.128) 
1989 vs 1986#indebtedness -0.581* 0.121 -0.014 0.009 
 (0.233) (0.190) (0.151) (0.123) 
1992 vs 1989#indebtedness 0.457* -0.230 0.022 0.267* 
 (0.201) (0.164) (0.128) (0.117) 
1995 vs 1992#indebtedness -0.255 -0.018 0.019 -0.191 
 (0.207) (0.167) (0.124) (0.114) 
1998 vs 1995#indebtedness 0.007 -0.089 0.212 0.127 
 (0.181) (0.145) (0.131) (0.112) 
2001 vs 1998#indebtedness 0.097 -0.151 -0.312* -0.328** 
 (0.184) (0.141) (0.127) (0.113) 
2004 vs 2001#indebtedness 0.076 0.013 -0.051 -0.108 
 (0.186) (0.130) (0.119) (0.114) 
2007 vs 2004#indebtedness -0.188 0.221 -0.008 0.190 
 (0.172) (0.118) (0.114) (0.109) 
2010 vs 2007#indebtedness 0.155 -0.066 0.163 -0.005 
 (0.149) (0.120) (0.110) (0.108) 
2013 vs 2010#indebtedness -0.067 0.004 0.042 0.133 
 (0.132) (0.118) (0.104) (0.104) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
 
2001 and 1998 is significantly negative, indicating a larger negative effect of highleverage 
on healthstatus in 2001. Finally, in Model 4, the contrasts of 1992-1989 and 2001-1998 
are significant, the former of which is positive. These contrasts are meaningful because the 
effect of lowliquidity on healthstatus was significant in these years (see Table 5). The 
contrast between 2001 and 1998 especially indicates a significant short-term shift in the 
correlation between indebtedness and household health. What is interesting is that the most 
important economic recession since the Great Depression had no significant impact on this 
correlation based on the contrast between 2010 and 2007. Nevertheless, these results 
support Hypothesis 2a claiming a change in the marginal effect of indebtedness on 




Testing Hypothesis 2b 
 In all models, the 1986 dummy has a significant positive coefficient, which 
indicates an upward shift of the correlation between healthstatus and all explanatory 
variables. From 1989 to 1995, year dummies have insignificant coefficients in all models. 
1998 onwards, year dummies have significant negative coefficients in the first three 
models. In Model 4, year dummies remain insignificant. To see if there is a short-term 
structural shift of the intercept across years, the contrasts of predicted margins between two 
consecutive years are presented in Table 7. Except the positive shift from 1983 to 1986 and 
then a negative shift from 1986 to 1989, there is no significant change in the regression 
intercept in any other year. There is evidence to support Hypothesis 2b, which was similar 
 
Table 7. Contrast of Predicted Margins Between Years for the Probability of Having 
Positive Health 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1986 vs 1983 0.274** 0.278** 0.275** 0.315** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) 
1989 vs 1986 -0.397** -0.402** -0.402** -0.406** 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) 
1992 vs 1989 0.003 0.007 0.015 -0.007 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) 
1995 vs 1992 -0.011 -0.007 -0.013 0.011 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
1998 vs 1995 -0.035 -0.033 -0.051 -0.049 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
2001 vs 1998 -0.099 -0.099 -0.080 -0.067 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
2004 vs 2001 -0.102* -0.090 -0.098 -0.052 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
2007 vs 2004 0.057 0.057 0.053 0.025 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) 
2010 vs 2007 0.023 0.015 0.012 0.018 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
2013 vs 2010 -0.029 -0.043 -0.039 -0.053 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Standard errors in parentheses 








This study contributed to the literature on the relationship between indebtedness 
and household health by looking at the issue from a more historical viewpoint, which was 
lacking in other studies. U.S. households that are living longer are reporting better health, 
while the younger households are reporting worsening health. Therefore, aging can’t be an 
explanation for the worsening health of U.S. adults that are below 65 years of age. 
Deterioration of SES might be another explanation, in which indebtedness plays an 
important mediating role. 
The statistical evidence in this study is based on 11 waves of the SCF since 1983. 
Using multivariate analysis, we tried to demonstrate the association between indebtedness 
and household self-reported health status. There are four different measures of 
indebtedness used: Financial insolvency, falling behind loan payments, high financial 
leverage, and low liquidity. Age, marital status, race, education and employment status of 
the household head as well as family income and assets are controlled.  
Three claims were tested in this study. First and foremost, we investigated whether 
indebtedness is associated with worsening household health status. We found evidence that 
households with low liquidity (liquid assets/monthly gross income < 1) are less likely to 
report excellent/good health as their health status. This gives partial support to the first 
hypothesis. Next, we wanted to see if there has been a change in the marginal effect of 
indebtedness on household health by looking at the interaction of indebtedness variables 




exceptions in two years. However, interaction terms compare each year to 1983, the base 
year. To better see the change between two consecutive years, we calculated the contrast 
of predicted margins between two consecutive years and identified a significant change in 
the marginal effect of indebtedness in 2001 for Model 4. These results confirmed our 
second hypothesis. Finally, we tested whether there has been an overall shift in our 
regression equations across years, which we expected to be positive in recessionary years 
following Ruhm’s findings. However, we failed to identify any significant shift in 
recession years to support this last hypothesis.  
One of the determinants of physical health that wasn’t mentioned in this study is 
health behaviors. Unfortunately, SCF doesn’t collect any information regarding health 
behaviors of households. However, from an earlier discussion made in this study, we know 
that indebtedness can have huge impacts on health behaviors. Also, it is difficult to assess 
the causality between indebtedness and health in this study, which can run both ways. A 
clear assessment of the causality can be possible using a longitudinal dataset that gathers 
information on acute health events and the impact of those events on households’ 






DOES STUDENT LOAN DEBT AFFECT BORROWING  
BY YOUNG HOUSEHOLDS? 
 
Since 2010, student loan debt has become the second largest category of debt 
burden households carry in the United States (see Figure 21). Especially after the Great 
Recession, researchers have grown increasingly interested in the effects of this growing 
burden of student loan debt on households’ finances. One important pattern identified by 
researchers is that young adults have become less likely to purchase a home.  Overall, 
homeownership rates are at a historical low according to U.S. Census Bureau data.15 Since 
the majority of new homebuyers are young adults between the ages of 24 and 35, their 




Figure 21. Different Types of Debt (% of Total Debt) 
*SCF, 1989-2013 






















The results of a FRBNY (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) study have stirred 
this discussion recently. Brown and Caldwell (2013) found that young adults with existing 
student loan debt are “retreating from housing and auto markets” when they analyzed the 
FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel. They conclude: “Now, for the first time in at least ten 
years, thirty-year-olds with no history of student loans are more likely to have home-
secured debt than those with a history of student loans.” The finding that makes them reach 
this conclusion is summarized in Figure 22. Although the conclusion they reached is 
somewhat striking, their methodology and data have come under criticism. An important 
drawback of their methodology is clearly the lack of multivariate analysis that would allow 
them to control for variables that might be the cause of discrepancy in homeownership 
between student debtors and nonstudent debtors. The CCP (Consumer Credit Panel) is to 
blame for the lack of multivariate analysis due to its limited scope regarding the 
demographic characteristics of the sample. In the CCP, homeownership is deduced by the 
 
 
Figure 22. Proportion of Young Households With Home-Secured Debt at Age 30 
*FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax 
**Taken from Brown et al. (2015) with minor format changes. 
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(Cooper & Wang, 2014). Similarly, it is hard to infer the differences between college 
graduates and college nongraduates in the CCP because college education is deduced only 
through existing debt on student loans (Fry, 2014). 
This study takes on the issue of young adults’ retreat from the housing and auto 
markets from a different perspective. Instead of trying to establish a correlation and 
causality between homeownership and student loan debt of young households, which has 
been the common approach in the literature, this study will attempt to reveal the connection 
between student loan debt and young households’ access to credit markets. Two important 
questions will be investigated in this research. The first question is: “Are young households 
with existing student loan debt more likely to be turned down in credit applications than 
similar households with no student loan debt?” The second question is: “Are young 
households with existing student loan debt more likely to be discouraged to apply for credit 
than households with no student loan debt?” Answers to these two questions will shed light 
on the possible reasons why young households with student loan debt might be retreating 
from auto and housing markets. 
This study is unique both in its approach and its methodology. First of all, it is the 
first study in the literature that defines the credit approval process as a two-step process, 
which involves a demand decision (the decision to apply) and a supply decision (the 
decision to lend). Second, because of this two-step process, this study is the first study to 
use a Probit selection model for credit rationing of young households. 
 
Literature Review 
The studies on the correlation between student loan debt and young households’ 





category is the comparison approach. Studies under this category make comparisons of 
the financial outcomes between student loan borrowers and nonborrowers (or borrowers 
with no existing balance). Brown and Caldwell (2013) serves as an example of these 
studies. Fry (2014) also makes a comparison using the SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances) 
and finds no significant differences in asset holdings between households with existing 
student loan debt and households without any student loan debt when he controls for the 
college degree of a household head. Brown et al. (2015) is another example of studies with 
a comparative approach and shares similar results with the Brown and Caldwell study as 
well as the same dataset. Akers (2014), on the other hand, uses SCF data and disagrees 
with Brown and Caldwell’s conclusions. She concludes that the discrepancy in 
homeownership rates between households with student loan debt and without it disappears 
once the comparison is made according to having a college degree. An earlier study by 
Luong (2010) makes a comparison of student loan borrowers and nonborrowers in Canada, 
using a generalized linear model and two different datasets, namely the Survey of Labor 
and Income Dynamics (SLID) and the Survey of Financial Security (SFS). The conclusion 
of this study is that student loan borrowers with postsecondary education are less likely to 
have savings or financial investments or own their homes and tend to have a lower net 
worth than non-borrowers.  
The second category of studies is the control approach. Studies in this category 
employ multivariate analysis to control for factors that are likely to influence whether or 
not a household will be financially delinquent. Some of these studies exploit panel data to 
establish not only correlation, but also causality between student loan debt and financial 





between the 2009 networth of a household and student loan use of that household. Both the 
existence and the level of student loan debt in 2007 are significantly correlated with lower 
household net worth in 2009, when demographic variables are controlled. Two studies by 
Elliott et al. (2013a, 2013b) use the same methodology and data to find a negative 
association of student loan use with home equity and asset accumulation. Cooper and Wang 
(2014) look at PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) and NEL88 (1988 National 
Educational Longitudinal Survey) data. The first part of their study actually falls under the 
comparison category because they compare student loan borrowers and nonborrowers in 
regards to their homeownership and wealth holdings using the PSID data. The second part 
falls under the control category, which uses the NEL88 data and various control factors to 
find the effect of student loan use on future homeownership. The results from both parts 
imply lower likelihood to own a home and build wealth for student loan users compared to 
nonusers, which doesn’t vary much with the amount of time that has passed since a 
household head left school. Houle and Berger (2014) analyze the 1997 National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY97) and finds that educational debt is negatively 
correlated with both homeownership and the level of mortgage debt. Some of the studies 
under the control approach use cross-section analysis such as Shand (2007), which uses the 
2003 wave of the SCF, and Gicheva and Thompson (2015), which uses six waves of the 
SCF between 1995 and 2010. The former of these studies finds a negative and significant 
correlation between education loan debt and homeownership. The latter one looks at three 
different kinds of financial distress as well as homeownership. The results suggest 
education loan debt is associated with a higher probability of bankruptcy, late loan 





education loan debtors are less likely to be homeowners.  
 
Methodology 
There is somewhat of a consensus in the literature on the negative effects of student 
loan borrowing on households’ financial outcomes, particularly their home ownership. 
However, there is little mention of what the causality could be between these variables. Is 
it because young households become more conservative under the load of existing debt 
that deters them from entering the housing market? Or is it rather because they are restricted 
in their ability to obtain enough credit due to their existing load of debt that prevents them 
from being a homeowner? These explanations are obviously not mutually exclusive and 
both might have an impact on households’ decision making. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis is: “Ceteris paribus, student loan debt has an independent and 
significantly positive effect on a young household’s likelihood to be turned down in credit 
applications.”  
In order to test the first hypothesis, the process of credit rationing has to be defined 
clearly. In the Survey of Consumer Finances, a credit-rationed household is defined as a 
household whose credit application was turned down due to various reasons. Therefore, for 
a household to be credit rationed, that household first needs to apply for credit. Getting 
credit is a two-step process. The first step is to decide whether to apply, and the second 
step is getting approved. Studies on household credit constraints that use SCF ignore this 
two-step nature of credit approval and estimate the following equation: 





Y is the outcome variable, which is observed as households that applied for credit, 
but were turned down. X is the vector of debt variables (student loan debt and other forms 
of debt), C is the vector of control variables, α and β are the corresponding vectors of 
coefficients and ε is the error term that includes unobserved determinants of Y. This 
equation assumes that applying for credit is a random event. However, the existence of 
unobservable factors that can directly influence the application decision can create a 
selection bias if those unobservables are also correlated with the likelihood of being credit 
rationed. Heckman (1979) provides unbiased estimators using a two-step technique when 
there is sample selection. Heckman’s original contribution was estimating wage equations, 
which have a continuous dependent variable. Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) uses 
Heckman selection in a probit model in which the outcome is a binary variable. To 
formulate simply: 
𝑌 = 𝛼1𝑋 + 𝛽1𝐶 + 𝛿1𝐴 + 𝜀                                              (4) 
𝐴 = 𝛼1𝑋 + 𝛽1𝐶 + 𝛿1𝐴 + 𝜀                                              (5) 
A is the selection outcome, which can be observed for households that applied for 
credit, Z is the vector of variables that are not correlated with Y directly but will influence 
households’ decision to apply. Note that, unlike the original Heckman model, 𝑢 and 𝜀 are 
both distributed with 𝑁(0,1). 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis is: “Ceteris paribus, student loan debt has an independent 
and significantly positive effect on a young household’s likelihood to be discouraged to 
apply for credit.” 





(discouraged) on student loan debt together with independent variables. The probit model 
can be written as: 
𝐷 = 𝛼𝑋 + 𝛽𝐶 + 𝜔                                                     (6) 
𝜔 ~ 𝑁(0,1)                                                           (7) 
𝐷 =1 for households that are discouraged to apply for credit (and 0 otherwise). 𝑋 
and 𝐶 are control variables for financial and demographic determinants, and 𝜔 is the 
unobserved determinants of being discouraged (𝐷).  
 
Data 
The source of data is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is normally 
a triennial survey sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board in cooperation with the 
Department of the Treasury. The data has been collected by NORC at the University of 
Chicago since 1992, but the first SCF was conducted earlier in 1983. The most recent wave 
of the SCF was completed in 2013. The particular wave we are interested in is the 2007 
survey. Due to the financial recession that broke right after the 2007 wave, households that 
agreed were resurveyed in 2009. As a result, 89% percent (3,862) of households that were 
surveyed in 2007 (4,422) agreed to participate in the follow-up survey. 14.5% (561) of total 
households that participated in the panel were young adult households (age 24-35). 
The advantages of the SCF Panel are twofold. First, SCF is the only dataset on 
household finances that provides detailed opinion variables such as attitudes toward 
borrowing as well detailed financial variables. Second, the panel nature of it allows 
researchers to establish a healthy causality between 2007 characteristics of households and 
2009 outcomes. For instance, the only study that is similar in scope to this study in the 





SCF, which use different samples of households for every wave. This raises one important 
difficulty for establishing a healthy causality. Let’s say we are looking at the 2007 wave of 
the SCF. The survey question for assessing whether or not a household is turned down for 
credit is: “In the past five years, has a particular lender or creditor turned down any request 
you or your (husband/wife/partner) made for credit, or not given you as much credit as you 
applied for?” If a household stated that they were turned down, it could be in the last few 
months or in the last few years. If this household has an existing debt on a student loan, 
this debt might or might not have existed before that credit application. It is hard to deduce 
if it was the existing burden of debt that might have caused being turned down for credit in 
the past.  
The other advantage of the 2007-09 panel is in the way it asks the aforementioned 
survey question in 2009: “In the past two years, has a particular lender or creditor turned 
down any request you or your (husband/wife/partner) made for credit, or not given you as 
much credit as you applied for?” We therefore have information on student loan 
indebtedness in 2007 and denial of credit between 2007 and 2009. The panel nature of the 
data thus allows us to see whether the student loan debt precedes the denial of credit. 
The most important difficulty in using the SCF for statistical inference is the large 
number of missing observations, especially the observations on nominal variables such as 
family income, debt and assets. Due to missing observations, SCF data is multiply 
imputed.16 Therefore, SCF data contains 5 different imputed values for nominal variables 
for the same household. If one doesn’t take into account the imputed nature of the SCF 
                                                          
 






data, statistical software (STATA in this case) will treat 5 different implicates as 5 different 
observations (households) and the resulting estimators will be biased (Montalto & Yuh, 
1998). To make healthy statistical inference, we need to find correct unbiased estimators 
and t values. For a probit model, we follow Montalto and Yuh (1998) to find the unbiased 
estimators and correct t values. All of the results presented later are already corrected for 
multiple imputation and therefore provide healthy statistical inference. 
The other problem with SCF is called “sampling variability error” as pointed out 
earlier. Due to privacy concerns, SCF doesn’t release crucial details on households that are 
necessary for resampling. However, as an alternative, SCF publishes replicate weights for 
1989 onwards. The user-written scfcombo macro for STATA allows researchers to control 
for both imputation error and sampling variance using replicate weights and all five 
implicates of observations. However, this macro doesn’t work with the estimation 
command heckprobit that is necessary to estimate the selection model. As a result, mean 
and coefficient standard errors are not corrected for sampling variance.  
The other disadvantage of the 2007-2009 survey is its timing. A major financial 
recession restricted access to credit for many households because lenders were reluctant to 
lend in a tight credit market. This is expected to have a negative effect on credit approval 
rates for all the households. The difficulty is, it is not possible to assess whether or not the 
recession hit households in risk groups (low-income, low-asset, minority households) more 
than other households. If these households are affected more in their access to credit than 
other households, credit approval rates will be systematically lower for them when 
everything else is controlled. 





Table 8. Variable Descriptions 
Crationed = 1 if a household applied for credit in 2007-09 and is either 
outright turned down for any amount or partially funded, = 
0 otherwise. 
Applied = 1 if a household applied for credit in 2007-09, = 0 
otherwise. 
Discouraged = 1 if a household thought of applying for credit in 2007-09 
but didn't apply, = 0 otherwise 
Household Income  Household income in 2007 ($10,000) 
Household Education Debt Household education loan debt in 2007 ($10,000) 
Households With Education 
Debt 
= 1 if a household has education loan debt in 2007, = 0 
otherwise. 
Household Other Debt  Household debt outstanding from loans other than education 
in 2007 ($10,000) 
Household Liquid Assets  Liquid household assets in 2007 ($10,000) 
Household Other Assets  Nonliquid household assets in 2007 ($10,000) 
 Employed = 1 if household head is either part-time or full-time 
employed in 2007, = 0 otherwise. 
 College Degree = 1 if household head has some college degree, = 0 
otherwise. 
Age  Age of the household head in 2007. 
 White = 1 if a household head is White in 2007, = 0 otherwise. 
 Married = 1 if a household head is married in 2007, = 0 otherwise. 
Household Had Fallen 
Behind Payments 
= 1 if a household is behind 60+ days on any loan payment 
in 2007, = 0 otherwise. 
Negative Attitude Towards 
Borrowing  
= 1 if a household has negative attitude toward debt in 2007, 
= 0 otherwise. 
Positive Attitude Towards 
Borrowing 
= 1 if a household has positive attitude toward debt in 2009, 
= 0 otherwise. 
Household Can Borrow 
$3000+ In an Emergency 
= 1 if a household has a family member or a friend that can 
assist them with $3,000 or more in case of an emergency in 
2007, = 0 otherwise. 












to crationed and discouraged are presented in Table 9. To illustrate the correlation between 
student loans debt and these variables, we can look at the Figure 23, which only includes 
households headed by individuals between the ages 24-35 and that applied for a loan 
between 2007 and 2009. It is interesting to see that there is no significant systematic 
difference of student loan debt between credit-rationed households and the ones that are 
not rationed. In fact, credit-rationed households have slightly less education and other kinds 
of debt on average than nonrationed households. Similarly, the relationship between being 
discouraged to apply for credit and student loans debt is inverse: Young households with 
lower student loan debt and other kinds of debt in 2007 are more likely to be discouraged 
to apply for credit.   
 
Results 
Testing Hypothesis 1 
Table 9 provides the summary statistics for the Probit Selection Model. Note that 
approximately 39% of the sample is censored (didn’t apply for credit). Nearly 30% of those 
who applied were credit rationed. Also, only 34.4% of young households hold any student 
loan debt, which makes inclusion of education debt as a binary variable relevant. This 
sample is by no means a representative sample of young U.S. households. As a reference, 
individuals in the same age group from the 2007 IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2015) sample had 
an average marriage rate of 52%, 73% of them are white, and 41.2% had some college 
degree including graduate and associate degrees. 
Table 10 gives the results of analysis of credit rationing.  Model 1 uses the 
continuous definition of the educationdebt variable, whereas Model 2 uses the binary 





Table 9. Descriptive Statistics by Crationed and Discouraged 













Household Income 6.397 (0.785) 4.831 (0.448) 6.493 (0.521) 3.948 (0.203) 
Household Liquid Assets 1.749 (0.397) 0.873 (0.322) 1.816 (0.279) 0.587 (0.207) 
Household Other Assets 24.068 (4.505) 17.767 (8.076) 23.572 (3.299) 12.795 (5.233) 
Household Education Debt 1.190 (0.167) 0.907 (0.230) 0.967 (0.124) 0.698 (0.126) 
Households With Education Debt  0.413 (0.032) 0.288 (0.044) 0.347 (0.024) 0.338 (0.037) 
Household Other Debt 9.917 (0.827) 8.454 (1.618) 10.084 (0.676) 5.874 (1.111) 
Age  30.074 (0.209) 29.515 (0.341) 29.918 (0.169) 29.692 (0.282) 
White 0.684 (0.030) 0.618 (0.048) 0.684 (0.023) 0.559 (0.039) 
Married  0.684 (0.030) 0.712 (0.044) 0.661 (0.024) 0.660 (0.037) 
College Degree 0.467 (0.032) 0.263 (0.043) 0.471 (0.025) 0.188 (0.031) 
Employed  0.938 (0.016) 0.863 (0.034) 0.897 (0.015) 0.886 (0.025) 
Negative Attitude Towards 
Borrowing  
0.367 (0.031) 0.240 (0.042) 0.337 (0.024) 0.348 (0.037) 
Positive Attitude Towards 
Borrowing  
0.304 (0.030) 0.304 (0.045) 0.291 (0.023) 0.330 (0.037) 
Household Can Borrow $3000+ In 
an Emergency  
0.758 (0.028) 0.572 (0.049) 0.700 (0.023) 0.600 (0.039) 
Filed Bankruptcy 0.082 (0.018) 0.148 (0.035) 0.063 (0.012) 0.144 (0.028) 





Figure 23. Education and Other Debts of Young Households in 2007 by Crationed and 
Discouraged ($10,000 Current) 
*SCF, 2007-2009 Panel 


























Table 10. Results for the Probit Selection Model  
  
Model 1  
2nd Stage 
Model 1  
1st Stage 
Model 2  
2nd Stage 
Model 2  
1st Stage 
Household Income in 2007 -0.011* 0.002 -0.013 0.002 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Household Liquid Assets in 
2007 
0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) 
Household Other Assets in 2007 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Household Other Debts in 2007 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Household Education Debt in 
2007 
-0.214** 0.243** -0.327 0.329* 
(0.105) (0.119) (0.243) (0.179) 
Interaction of College Degree 
and Education Debt 
0.188* -0.198 0.175 -0.145 
(0.108) (0.123) (0.266) (0.254) 
Household Head Has College 
Degree in 2007 
-0.304** 0.044 -0.292 0.026 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.182) (0.159) 
Age of Household Head in 2007 -0.023 0.009 -0.026 0.010 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
Household Head Was Married 
in 2007 
-0.049 0.122 0.002 0.125 
(0.121) (0.119) (0.183) (0.122) 
Household Head Is White -0.111 0.052 -0.106 0.049 
(0.117) (0.118) (0.129) (0.123) 
Household Head Was 
Employed in 2007 
-0.471** 0.289* -0.348 0.274 
(0.183) (0.172) (0.258) (0.179) 
Household Had Fallen Behind 
Payments Before 2007 
0.463** -0.091 0.522** -0.080 
(0.224) (0.214) (0.225) (0.255) 
Negative Attitude Towards 








Positive Attitude Towards 








Household Can Borrow $3000+ 








Constant 1.556*** -0.294 1.143 -0.412  
(0.513) (0.505) (1.128) (0.549) 
Observations 561 561 561 561 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Notes: Sample is not weighed with analytical weights.  







here are the 𝜒2 statistics for the test of independence between the selection and the main 
equations. For both cases, this statistic is highly significant, which leads us to conclude that 
there is indeed a selection issue. This confirms the validity of the selection model to address 
the selection bias. 
Another thing to note is that standard errors are highly sensitive to the change in 
the definition of the educationdebt variable. This is not very surprising given the fact that 
only one third of the sample carries some student loan debt. Level of the student loan debt, 
not the existence of it is actually associated with credit rationing. 
It is evident that education loan debt has a significantly negative effect on the 
probability of being turned down in credit applications for young households with no 
college degree. College degree, on its own, has a significant negative effect as well. The 
interaction term has a significant positive sign, at least in the estimation that uses the 
continuous definition of educationdebt variable. This means young households with 
college degree and student loan debt are more likely to be turned down for credit compared 
to other college graduate households without any student loan debt. However, the impact 
of the interaction term is not large enough to offset the direct (negative) effect of student 
loan debt. To move from statistical inference to economic inference, we need to look at the 
marginal effect of education loan debt on the probability of being turned down. Table 11 
presents the probability of being turned down conditional on having applied for credit. All  
the other characteristics are held constant.17 
 
We can measure the impact of $10,000 debt in education loans for households with 
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Table 11. Probability of Being Credit Rationed Conditional on Credit Application 
No College Degree, No Education Debt 0.326*** 
 (0.043) 
College Degree, No Education Debt 0.156*** 
 (0.040) 
No College Degree, $10,000 Education Debt  0.292*** 
 (0.055) 
College Degree, $10,000 Education Debt 0.162*** 
 (0.038) 
No College Degree, $20,000 Education Debt 0.255*** 
 (0.085) 
College Degree, $20,000 Education Debt 0.167*** 
 (0.038) 
No College Degree, $30,000 Education Debt 0.217** 
 (0.109) 
College Degree, $30,000 Education Debt 0.171*** 
 (0.041) 
No College Degree, $40,000 Education Debt 0.179 
 (0.123) 
College Degree, $40,000 Education Debt 0.175*** 
 (0.046) 
Standard errors in parentheses 




no college degree by comparing the probabilities in first and third rows. The difference is 
3.4% reduction in the probability to be turned down for the first $10,000 debt in student 
loans. For another $10,000 debt, probability declines for another 3.7% (see Row 5). The 
effect of additional $10,000s in student loan debt stays at 3.8% reduction in the probability. 
On the other hand, young households with college degrees, with or without student loan 
debt, have lower probability to be credit rationed. This shows how big of an impact college 
education can have on credit applications, which will be discussed more later. However, 
we don’t observe the same probability reducing effect of carrying student loan debt for 
college educated households. On the contrary, the probability increases incrementally (0.5-




Nevertheless, it indicates an important difference between how student loan debt is 
associated with credit approval outcomes for non-college-educated and college-educated 
young households. It is possible that student loan debt doesn’t signal much about 
households with college degree, while it signals positive financial information about 
households with no college degree. This might be due to the possibility that some 
households attended some college, but haven’t finished their degrees in 2007, before they 
applied for credit. The prospect for a possible college degree in the near future for these 
households seems to be valuable information for creditors. 
The only other financial variable that has significant impact is household income. 
Higher income is undoubtedly associated with lower probability to be turned down in a 
credit application for young households. Employment in 2007 (employed) similarly, has a 
significantly negative effect on odds of credit rationing. Loan delinquency 60+ days 
(behindpayments), on the other hand, increases the chances to be turned down for credit.   
One demographic variable that is of particular importance here is White. Racial 
identity has been discussed in the literature as an important factor that affects a household’s 
likelihood to be turned down for credit (Duca & Rosenthal, 1991, 1993; Yinger, 1998). 
Our results don’t provide support for these claims. 
Looking at these results, we can safely reject Hypothesis 1, which claimed: “Ceteris 
paribus, student loan debt has an independent and significantly positive effect on a young 
household’s likelihood to be turned down in credit applications.” As predicted probabilities 
in Table 11 showed, student loan debt reduces the odds of credit rationing for households 






The College Effect 
 As pointed earlier, college has an independent significantly negative impact on the 
odds of being turned down in credit applications for young households. The economic 
significance of this impact can be measured by looking at the predicted probabilities of 
college educated and non-college-educated households at any level of education debt in 
Table 11. To start with, college education has a marginal effect of 17% reduction in the 
odds of rationing for households with no education debt. This gap is 13%, 8.8%, 4.5%, and 
0.4% for $10,000, $20,000, $30,000 and $40,000 debt in education loans, respectively. 
Clearly, the positive benefit young households get from having a college degree when they 
apply for loans diminishes as their student loan debt gets larger. To see if the benefit of 
college degree (or lack of it) is statistically significant for different levels of education loan 
debt, we calculated the contrast of predicted probabilities of being credit rationed for 
college educated and non-college-educated households for five different levels of 
education debt in Table 12. 
 The reduction in the predicted probability due to having college education is 17% 
for households with no student loan debt and it is statistically significant. It is 13% 
significant reduction for households with $10,000 debt in student loans. However, for 
higher levels of education loan debt, the contrast of predicted probabilities is not 
statistically significant. This means that college education doesn’t have a statistically 
meaningful effect on reducing the chances that a young household will be turned down for 






Table 12. Marginal Effect of College Degree With Respect to Education Debt 
College Degree @ Education Debt = 0 -0.170*** 
 (0.049) 
College Degree @ Education Debt = 1 -0.130** 
 (0.059) 
College Degree @ Education Debt = 2 -0.089 
 (0.089) 
College Degree @ Education Debt = 3 -0.046 
 (0.114) 
College Degree @ Education Debt = 4 -0.004 
 (0.129) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
  
 
Testing Hypothesis 2 
Table 9 (p. 97) presents the summary statistics for the estimation of 
discouragement. Almost 30% of young adult households are discouraged to apply for a 
loan. It is worth noting that a household that reports being discouraged to apply for some 
particular loan might still apply for another loan and might even end up getting it. In the 
survey, being discouraged and applying for a loan are measured in two different questions. 
This makes sense because applying for a loan is directly observable, whereas being 
discouraged is not directly observable. As a result of this, there are households who applied 
for loans but were also observed as discouraged, as well as households who were not 
discouraged but didn’t apply for loans either.  
Table 13 gives the probit estimation results. Note that Model 1 uses the continuous 
definition of educationdebt, whereas Model 2 uses the binary definition that is equal to 1 
if household has any student loans. Education debt has no significant effect on being 
discouraged. Neither does the interaction term, regardless of how education debt is defined. 
Other assets have a significantly positive effect on being discouraged, which is counter 




Table 13. Results for the Probit Model (Dependent Variable: Discouraged) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Household Income in 2007 -0.066*** -0.066***  
(0.024) (0.024) 
Household Liquid Assets in 2007 -0.009 -0.007  
(0.025) (0.026) 
Household Other Assets in 2007 0.002** 0.002**  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Household Other Debt in 2007 -0.001 -0.001  
(0.005) (0.005) 
Household Education Debt in 2007 0.153 0.164  
(0.103) (0.174) 
Interaction of College Degree and Education Debt -0.129 0.178 
(0.108) (0.289) 
Household Head Had College Degree in 2007 -0.539*** -0.698***  
(0.165) (0.205) 
Age of Household Head in 2007 -0.012 -0.012  
(0.018) (0.018) 
Household Head Was Married in 2007 0.151 0.156  
(0.138) (0.138) 
Household Head Is White -0.337*** -0.317**  
(0.127) (0.127) 
Household Head Was Employed in 2007 0.219 0.210  
(0.194) (0.193) 
Household Was Delinquent on Loans 60+ Days 0.598** 0.580** 
(0.235) (0.238) 
Household Had Filed a Bankruptcy Prior to 2007 0.322 0.326* 
(0.198) (0.198) 
Constant 0.090 0.088  
(0.560) (0.564) 
Observations 561 561 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 










other assets is composed of residential property, which comes with mortgage debt. This 
makes other assets closely correlated with other debt. Household income has a highly 
significant negative effect on the odds of being discouraged. Falling behind loan payments 
60+ days is associated with increasing probability to be discouraged. College education 
reduces the chances to be discouraged for young households. 
Perhaps the most interesting result here is the significantly negative effect of White 
on being discouraged that is consistent for both of the estimations. Non-White households 
that are young, compared to White young households with similar financial and 
demographic characteristics, are more likely to be discouraged to apply for loans. It is hard 
to see what might be the underlying reason for this result without any further analysis, but 
minority young households might be internalizing racial discrimination in the lending 
markets. Financial barriers that have been put by the lending institutions might have forced 
these households to simply give up. It is an important issue with many social and political 
repercussions that needs to be further analyzed.  
In conclusion, we can safely reject Hypothesis 2, which states: “Ceteris paribus, 
student loan debt has an independent and significantly positive effect on a young 
household’s likelihood to be discouraged to apply for credit.”  
 
Discussion 
What are the conclusions we can draw from this study? First and foremost, the issue 
of young households’ retreat from the credit markets, not just housing markets, is a more 
complicated issue than simply observing correlations. Without any clear causal link, one 





Even with the causality problem addressed, the decision to participate in the 
housing market in particular, and credit markets in general, is a multifaceted process. First, 
a young household needs to decide whether or not they want to apply for a loan. If they 
choose to do so, then the ball is in the lender’s court to decide whether or not the application 
is approved. 
Both in making a decision to apply or being approved, the interaction of household 
characteristics with the education loan debt will further complicate the problem. Here, we 
identified only one of these interactions, which in our opinion is the most prominent one. 
College graduates are affected differently than those with no college degree in the approval 
step of a loan application. Student loan debt reduces the probability to be turned down in a 
loan application for non-college-educated young households, whereas it increases the 
probability marginally for college educated households (see Table 11). From the lender 
perspective, or from the supply side if you will, a college degree is highly praised. 
Education loan debt has little effect for a household if they are college graduates, while it 
acts as a stepping stone for households with no college degree. Perhaps, in the eye of a 
lender, education loan debt acts as a primer for high future earnings for a household that 
doesn’t have a college degree but provides no additional information to the lender for a 
household that already has a college degree. 
College education itself is an important determinant of the outcome of a loan 
application for a young household. College educated households are less likely to be turned 
down compared to their non-college-educated peers. However, after calculating the 
marginal effect of college degree on the odds of credit rationing in Table 12, we saw that 




insignificant after $10,000 debt in student loans and economically insignificant after 
$40,000 debt. In other words, the benefit of college education is offset by having student 
loan debt as the debt burden grows.  
The results for the effects of education loan debt on being discouraged to apply are 
not conclusive. Neither the education debt nor other debt appears to have any effect on a 
young household’s probability to be discouraged to apply for credit. On the other hand, 
race is not a factor that can be overlooked in loan applications. Race didn’t seem to matter 
statistically in the Probit selection model for being credit-rationed. However, discouraged 
estimations provided evidence for what might be called “racial self-selection in loan 
applications.” This self-selection happens at a level deeper than the decision to apply. 
White households are less discouraged to apply for a loan. Therefore, the only non-White 
households that actually end up applying for a loan are the ones who think they are likely 
to be approved. It looks like non-White households might be observing and internalizing 
some racial discrimination that can’t be observed in our data. 
There are important policy conclusions that could be drawn from this interesting 
result. First and foremost, student loan debt doesn’t appear to be an alarming issue for 
young households in regards to their access to credit. If anything, student loan debt is a 
positive contributor to their participation in credit markets because it possibly opens the 
door for a college degree for those who don’t have one, which will translate into better 
family income. However, there is no guarantee that having student loan debt will actually 
result in a college degree for these households.18 In the long term, failure to graduate might 
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put them in a very difficult financial impasse. It is essential then for these households to 
obtain a college degree and turn their student loan debt into a positive outcome. Given the 
institutional separation of obtaining an education loan and provision of higher education in 
the US, it seems difficult to monitor the progress of a household with student loan debt 
towards a college degree. A feasible solution would be establishing an institutional bridge 
between higher education and education financing to closely monitor if education loans are 
channeled into successful graduations. Recent federal and local efforts to regulate for-profit 
higher education institutions all around the country are a good example of this. They should 
be further extended into nonprofit higher education, and households that are having 
challenges to get a college degree should be offered academic and financial aid to realize 
their goals and should be discouraged to get under more student loan debt. 
Policy challenges are a little different for college graduate young households. 
Perhaps the biggest issue many young households face when they graduate from college is 
overborrowing in student loans. Overborrowing occurs when a student borrows beyond 
his/her repayment capacity after graduation. Avery and Turner (2012) show that 
overborrowing can be particularly important given the “substantial and increasing variation 
in realized earnings within different levels of postsecondary attainment…” (pp. 188-189). 
College graduates that are employed at lower paying jobs are more likely to suffer the 
negative effects of overborrowing in student loans than their peers. Our estimates showed 
that overborrowing in student loans can offset the positive benefits of having a college 
degree when it comes to credit approval. There are different strategies to prevent college 
students to overborrow in student loans. First of all, high-school students should be 
                                                          
reported their work status as “work only.” This means these 25 households have invested in some college 




educated about the real cost of college and average life-time earnings of the career they 
want to have after they graduate. Making a financially feasible decision before investing 
in college is essential to have a more manageable debt burden after graduation. Second, the 
average time to graduate from college should be reduced to prevent students from staying 
in college longer than they should and accumulating debt. Third, the repayment of student 
loans after graduation should be restructured according to one’s disposable income. What 
is currently done by the Federal Government under the Student Loan Forgiveness Program 
is a great head start. However, it only applies to public student loans. There are numerous 
consolidation programs for private student loans as well. Currently there is no federal 
regulation of these private programs. A federal plan that will encompass private student 
loans that is similar to the Homeowners Affordability and Stability Plan in scope might 
address this issue. 
There are other challenges to solve some other issues raised in this study such as 
high discouragement of non-White young households in credit applications. The dynamics 
behind this observation should be revealed in an in-depth analysis. It is crucial to first 
understand and then lift the barriers minority young households face in entry to credit 
markets.  
Note that the focus of this study was not seeing the effect of student loans on young 
homeownership, although that was our inspiration. If there was a way in the SCF to see 
what kind of loans young households applied for, perhaps we would have a better 
understanding of whether young households are particularly rationed in mortgage 
applications. The SCF partially provides that information, but only for households that are 




Another limitation of the data is that it is hard to determine the exact timing of 
credit application between 2007 and 2009. Credit application might have happened right 
after the 2007 interview or right before the 2009 follow up. This leaves room for the 
possibility that a household that didn’t have student loan debt at the time of the 2007 
interview might have accumulated some before the credit application. Such a household 
would be considered to have no student loan debt in our analysis, which might give us 
biased results.  As a matter of fact, 371 young households didn’t report any education loan 
debt in 2007. Forty-four of these households reported education loan debt in 2009, the 
average of which was a little above $14,500. However, 28% of these 44 households were 
rationed in their credit applications. Because 28% is very close to the sample average of 
30.5%, we doubt that these 44 households actually create a bias in our results. Also, as we 
pointed out earlier, SCF is not designed to be a representative sample of young households 
in the US, although it is a representative sample of all households in the US. Conclusions 
drawn from this study cannot be generalized to all the young households in the US 
confidently.  
We analyzed the effects of student loan debt on young households’ credit 
applications to see if their low homeownership rates could be due to difficulty in obtaining 
credit in general. However, the tendency we observe that today’s young households have 
lower homeownership rates than previous generations might be due to a larger change than 
growing student loan debt. What student debt allowed in the United States is greater college 
enrollment. With this greater college enrollment comes a unique social change. The 
transition to young adulthood has slowed down in the United States. This point is also 




or desire to have a family, buy a home and have all the other perks of the American Dream. 
Perhaps the dynamics of this social change should be investigated with more care in order 









This dissertation presents an alternative viewpoint on household borrowing. Instead 
of relying on utility analysis, which requires rigid assumptions on human nature and 
markets, such as perfect rationality, perfect information and well-defined consumer 
preferences, this research develops a more flexible and multidisciplinary approach. By 
taking into account the changing institutional structure of the US economy, the social 
dimension to the issue of indebtedness and the effects of major shocks to the economy, we 
find that debt is as much of a curse to households as it is a blessing. It is obvious that 
without a multidisciplinary look, any analysis of indebtedness will fail to see this 
dichotomous nature of debt.  
One of the important finding of this research is that the Great Recession reversed 
the correlation between indebtedness and positive attitudes toward borrowing. Prior to the 
recession years, indebtedness was weakly associated with positive attitudes toward 
borrowing. The recession was a large shock, not only to household finances, but also to the 
way they perceive and accept indebtedness. This result is indicative of possible 
endogeneity between indebtedness and household attitudes. While some households are 
borrowing more because they are more accepting of debt (positive attitude), some 
households might be more or less accepting of it because they are indebted. Prior to the 
recession, many households with debt were less likely to feel the threat of indebtedness, 




after being struck with the most severe financial and economic crises since the Great 
Depression, the causality turned around as many more households were threatened with 
indebtedness. Instead of accepting indebtedness as a “frame of reference,” households 
began to actually pay attention to their indebtedness. Time will tell if the causality will 
revert back to what it was earlier as the U.S. economy progresses further on the recovery 
path. The data from the Survey of Consumer Expectations19 suggests that there has been a 
slight increase in the proportion of households that think they will have a better financial 
situation in the next year between 2013 and 2016. The next wave of the SCF, the results of 
which should be published in 2017, will paint a better picture of the recent changes in 
household attitudes toward borrowing. 
Also, the findings in the second chapter of this research showed that households in 
different socioeconomic statuses (SES) are affected distinctly by indebtedness. 
Particularly, the households at the bottom of the net financial worth and income 
distributions are most perversely affected by the negative health consequences of 
indebtedness. This result falls in line with the literature on SES-Health nexus that 
repeatedly explains what is called the SES gradient of household health. If indebtedness 
hits the least wealthy and the lowest income earners the hardest, policies should be 
designed in order to protect these households from the negative impacts of indebtedness 
on their wellbeing. Debt collection agencies, which still remain largely unregulated, are a 
good place to start. 
The final chapter of this research dealt with a growing concern of American society: 
                                                          
 





Student loan debt. The findings showed that, as far the young households in the 2007-09 
SCF Panel go, student loan debt doesn’t pose a threat to them for new loan applications. 
However, it is important to note that college education stands as the more important 
determinant of the probability that a young household will be turned down in a loan 
application than student loan debt. This brings us to the issue of college graduation rates. 
According to the National Center for Education Statistics data,20 the average graduation 
rate of the 2008 starting cohort within the first 6 years of full-time bachelor’s degree 
program in a nonprofit institution was 65.4% in 2014. In for-profit institutions, this rate 
drops to 26.5%. Investing in college and paying for tuition is a financially sound decision 
as long as one can actually graduate. This research showed that households with no college 
degree actually benefit from carrying student loan debt when they apply for another loan. 
However, it is also evident that an increasing number of young households with student 
loan payments end up not graduating from college. Especially those attending for-profit 
institutions are more likely to not realize their college dreams. The unique place of 
graduating from college as a life-long investment and the increasing cost of it require a 
closer inspection of the effects of student loan debt on young households’ socioeconomic 
wellbeing in a longitudinal setting. 
One last point to mention is the institutional evolution of the concept of debt in the 
U.S. economy. In 2013, the Federal Trade Commission commissioned research due to 
increasing numbers of consumer complaints about debt collectors in the aftermath of the 
housing market collapse. This research was titled “The Structure and Practices of the Debt 
Buying Industry” (Federal Trade Commission, 2013). This snapshot of the debt buying 
                                                          
 




business in the United States gave important insights into the immense growth in the 
volume of debt buying as well as the ill-mannered practices of the industry. It is an 
important question to answer whether this growth is a temporary result of the Great 
Recession or indicative of a more permanent change in the institution of debt. As Karl 
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